

Ladies and Gentlemen!

I have the honor of opening a conference devoted to the future of NATO, a conference held under the patronage of Poland's president, Lech Kaczyński.

I would like to welcome our distinguished foreign guests and thank them for coming here to share their experience. I would like to welcome ambassadors, representatives of armed forces and the government administration. I would also like to extend a warm welcome to representatives of non-governmental organizations who are also here with us today and the remaining participants of this conference. I am very glad that we have such a diverse group here.

A discussion on such a topic is one of the most important discussions that should be held both in our country and on the international arena among all those who are deeply interested and engaged in the future of the Alliance. NATO faces many challenges these days. A lively discussion, exchange of opinions, even arguments are essential in shaping the future of NATO and its role in the system of international security. They are essential for understanding NATO as well as for the improvement of its relations with international organizations. This is the aim of today's meeting. Today's debate should represent a contribution to a better understanding of how we envision the future of the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO is an extremely important and essential organization of international security. This is an Alliance whose stability, coherence and effectiveness of operations have been without precedent in history.

Poland joined NATO in 1999 and it was undoubtedly a historic moment for our country. It took place so late due to the fact that earlier the

whole Europe, the whole world was stuck in a bipolar order. However, the values which were the basis for the creation of NATO were always close to our heart. On one hand, we had an arrangement which was based on coercion, on enslavement while on the other hand the alliance although based on fear and focused on defense but still sharing common values. That's why I would like to remind you of a passage of so-called Report of the Committee of Three from 1956 summing up only several years of NATO's then activities. It read: "Although fear was a major impulse leading up to the creation of the Alliance what lied at its roots was also awareness that it is a rational thing to create a community of North Atlantic and western European countries based on the grounds other than only defense. Common cultural traditions, free institutions and democratic concepts endangered by those who do not share them constitute factors which should foster the rapprochement between NATO countries aimed not only at common defense but also at their development. This creates the sense of the North Atlantic Community parallel to our becoming aware of our common threats".

Much of what was written fifty years ago still holds water nowadays. The mentioned premises were also valid when Poland was joining NATO in 1999. These days, I think, we can say that we are an already experienced and active NATO member although not having as long an experience as many other countries. Poland is a country that is involved in NATO's operations very much with a considerable experience of functioning in NATO's structures and in implementing various tasks.

Currently a debate is underway among NATO members concerning its future. It is a positive fact because undoubtedly NATO is nowadays undergoing changes and facing many new challenges. The reform and the new shape of the North Atlantic Alliance should go in such a direction that would result in NATO being able to answer and to face new often very difficult and complicated challenges. 20th century was the century of conventional threats called symmetrical which resulted out of the competition between two big superpowers. 21st century will be the time of asymmetrical threats but also the century of many more complications of these threats. NATO has to adjust both its structure and its way of thinking and operating to new challenges. The development of operating capabilities of the North Atlantic Alliance as well as its management, command and decision taking structures should take into consideration these new

challenges and these new threats - both those connected with the present and with the future.

A very important problem in this context is a balance of proportions between defense capabilities of the North Atlantic Alliance and its capabilities of operating outside the treaty borders. This is a very important point of the ongoing discussion. I think it should be clearly stressed that collective defense which is mentioned in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is and should remain the main pillar of NATO. This is the core of NATO and there is no way of departing from it. Without this pillar it is really difficult to talk about coherence, effectiveness or efficiency of NATO. On the other hand, however, we cannot refuse to accept problems going beyond the narrowly understood defense of the territories of member states. I am thinking here about military operations and multifunctional stabilization missions carried out outside the North Atlantic area.

Another issue that needs to be discussed is undoubtedly the relationship between the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. European Security and Defense Policy is a very vital initiative which contributes not only to the political strengthening of the European Union but also to strengthening of the real security and defense capabilities of both the whole European Union and its particular members. It should be stressed that the development of the European Security and Defense Policy must be a supplement and not opposition or competition to the tasks implemented by the North Atlantic Alliance. The creation of a new area of conflict would not be serve as increasing the level of security. There is a necessity of finding harmony between NATO and the EU in order for both organizations to complement each other. Poland is engaged both in operations of NATO and in the construction of the European defense capabilities, for instance by creating European combat groups.

NATO's attention to security, capability of facing new challenges is not only this conventional attention to defense of a common territory. In this context it is worth thinking and acting with reference to multidimensional security of the North Atlantic Alliance and its members. I am thinking here, for example, about the issue of the energy security, the protection of so-called crucial infrastructure or the capability of management crisis in connection with the protection of crucial infrastructure. The fact that these issues receive more and more recognition and understanding within

NATO is an important factor shaping new and more integrated thinking about security. The fact that energy security was mentioned in the Final Declaration of the Riga Summit in November 2006 is also an evidence that NATO members and the Alliance itself started to think about security issues in an integrated way. In my opinion it is a crucial and important signal of the strengthening of the role of NATO in shaping this multi-surface approach to the security issue.

Poland undoubtedly is and wants to remain an active NATO member in every dimension of the operations of the North Atlantic Alliance. Poland gets involved in missions carried out by the North Atlantic Alliance with great determination. We participate in these missions because we think that one of the fundamental premises of the functioning of NATO is its inner solidarity. It is difficult to imagine an effective NATO without inner solidarity, without taking joint responsibility for various missions. Dodging solidarity leads in consequence to undermining the efficiency and role of the Alliance. It is in the context of such a solidarity that Poland undertakes its participation in missions carried out by the North Atlantic Alliance. We see these missions as bringing stability and liberation from many pathologies in countries like Afghanistan. I think that when we talk about missions this very important aspect should not be forgotten. It should be strongly stressed that NATO is not fighting there with Afghanistan but with pathologies consuming this country and is rather trying to create conditions for building a normal state and the development of this state. This is a fundamental aim. It should be remembered, though, that NATO is not only a “sword” – although it is its fundamental role – but it is also a sort of a “balm”. Stabilization missions should be connected with par excellence military missions allowing for the creation of a normal society while fighting various kinds of deeply rooted pathologies also constituting a threat to territories of all NATO member states. I think that this stabilizing role of the Alliance, creating regular social life, state administration, social care and so on is not to be forgotten or to be omitted. It is worth particular stressing.

Another important issue requiring a discussion and in consequence a decision is the issue of further enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO should be an alliance of “open doors”. NATO should be such an alliance which brings with it the enlargement of the stabilization zone and which not only enters those zones where stabilization has been definitely

achieved and established. First of all, it seems to me that fully stable zones do not really exist in reality. Secondly, an example of countries of central Europe proves the fact that joining NATO was a vital factor for their internal stabilization. That's why we are convinced that NATO's doors should remain open, if only for countries like Ukraine or Georgia and surely for many others which could be discussed here. Opening of NATO's doors should be an incentive for widening of the stabilization zone.

It remains a fact that NATO that we are a member of is not a perfect alliance and most probably will never be one. As of now, however, it is the best known guarantor of common security. Hence we have to do everything in order for it to be an effective and real guarantor actually based on a truly deep understanding of the issue of security and on the rules of mutual solidarity and mutual understanding of its intentions and needs.

Our aim is thus a loyal NATO whose members make joint efforts and take joint responsibilities. Our aim is NATO capable of effectively implementing its traditional tasks and undertaking new missions in the changing world. Our aim is NATO closely cooperating with and even complementing the European Union on the basis of complementarity and not competition. Our aim is NATO engaging in a constructive cooperation with many partners remaining outside the organization, especially with Russia which will lead to the strengthening and widening of the stabilization zone in the modern world.

Such a vision of the Alliance which really works for the benefit of common security and solidarity is close to all of us. I hope that today we will be able to discuss various approaches and different views on NATO and its relations with other subjects, thanks to which the Alliance will be better, more effective, longer lasting and more stable. I wish you all and obviously myself a good conference and a good discussion with notable effects. I invite you to join in the discussion.

Thank you very much.

NATO'S APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE

Peter Flory

Ladies and Gentlemen!

I am Peter Flory, I'm assistant secretary-general of NATO for defense investment. I am very pleased to be in Warsaw again, it is much warmer than the last time I was here.

I would like to thank you, minister Stasiak, for hosting this conference on the future of NATO. It is a very important discussion at this time. The missile defense is very much a part of the future as well as the present of NATO.

It is clear that missile defense goes to the heart of some of the core concepts of NATO such as the concept of collective defense or the concept of alliance solidarity. Before I go any further I would like to thank Poland for its multiple contributions to collective defense and alliance solidarity, particularly right now in the case of its increased contributions in Afghanistan. I would like to thank Poland for everything it has done for the Alliance.

The leadership with NATO, secretary-general de Hoop Scheffer – my boss – we all know that the Alliance has to have a serious and informed debate on missile defense, and in particular on the possible deployment of a NATO missile defense capability. At the same time we realize that it is a right of any sovereign nation to work alone or with others to defend itself against an attack or the threat of a missile attack. The United States, its European partners as well as secretary-general de Hoop Scheffer have been clear on a multitude of occasions in the discussion of the so-called

“Third Side” that the Alliance has no intention of delaying the process of building the American anti-missile shield. We have our own process to go through inside NATO but there is no intention at all of trying to sidetrack what you and the US and the Czech Republic are doing. However, a comprehensive discussion of this issue within NATO framework is, I would say, due and even in some ways overdue.

It’s clear that a discussion on the missile defense has to take place and is very much in the interest of all of our allies. The Alliance is the premiere framework for transatlantic security discussions. German Chancellor Merkel in Munich more than a year ago made this point and that remains very much true today. A necessary starting point for that discussion would have to be an agreement on the nature of the threat. This is one of the areas that we don’t see agreement in NATO. If NATO is to make decisions about balancing resources adequate to threats, it’s got to decide what a threat really is.

So, let me talk about the threat for a minute. I think it’s important to remind ourselves of what kind of world we are facing and why it is that we have to talk about things like missile defense. Again, there is general agreement in NATO expressed in a number of NATO statements at the highest level that there is a ballistic missile threat and that this is increasing. Now what we do see is differences on the immediacy of this threat to Europe and NATO. There are also different views on how best to address the threat. NATO statements have always been very clear that diplomacy and non-proliferation regimes and other means have an important part to play in slowing the spread of ballistic missile technology and weapons of mass destruction capabilities. It has become clear, though, to even most casual newspaper readers of late that these measures have not succeeded in several very important and worrisome cases. The North Korean nuclear test, Iran’s ongoing nuclear program and the increasingly ambitious and spectacular tests of North Korea’s and Iran’s missile programs suggest that both regimes are determined to develop their nuclear and missile capabilities. Both countries appear determined to continue these programs even in the face of international opposition, diplomatic criticism, sanctions and material hardship.

Despite extensive pressure from the international community, a great deal of multilateral diplomacy and now two rounds of UN Security Council

sanctions Iran continues to refuse to suspend its uranium enrichment thus opposing the UN Security Council Resolution 1737. What does this mean? I think there can be no doubt, as the French foreign minister Philippe Douste-Blazy said about a year ago, no civilian nuclear program can explain the Iranian nuclear program. It is an Iranian clandestine military nuclear program and we have to be clear about what that means.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing Iranian nuclear program we observe disturbing events in the Iranian missile program. On November 2 of last year Iran test-fired dozens of missiles including *Shahab II* and *Shahab III* missiles, the latter of which with range of over a thousand kilometers able to strike NATO's south-eastern flank. There are also reports that North Korea has shipped to Iran *BM25* missiles which could have a range of up to 3500 kilometers and could reach deep into Europe, including into Poland and the Czech Republic and the number of other allied countries. Most recently on the 23rd of January Iran tested another 5 missiles probably including at least one *Shahab III* extended range version which is estimated to have a range of around 1800 kilometers. Launched in western Iran such a missile it could strike into Turkey and south-eastern European countries such as Bulgaria and Romania. Unfortunately, there is disagreement among NATO member countries as to the full nature and maturity of the threat. I don't think you will find anyone who disagrees that there is a threat and that it is advancing into Europe.

The Iranian missiles or North Korean missiles in Iranian hands are certainly not the only source of concern. North Korea is more geographically remote from Europe than Iran is but we can't help but note that last year, last Fourth of July North Korea celebrated the American Independence Day by test-launching 7 missiles including the long-range type of *Taepo'dong-II* which was designed to strike the United States and then in November of last year North Korea conducted an underground test of a nuclear weapon.

Now, the United States and other countries, including European countries, have engaged in a great deal of diplomacy and nobody is assuming that diplomacy is destined to fail. I think, however, that it would not be wise to plan our security on an assumption that diplomacy will necessarily succeed. That's particularly true when one considers how long it takes to develop capabilities such as missile defenses and the desire not to find

yourself in a position where the potential adversary has already got their means of attack and you do not yet have an ability to counter it.

Since this is the world in which we find ourselves in today, what should we be doing about that? I think the most significant thing is the answer to the question of whether the discussions between the US, Poland and the Czech Republic on the possible deployment of US interceptors and a radar in those two countries as part of the system that will extend the protection of the existing US missile defense system to Europe. The US has been very clear that this system is not just something that will protect the US but in fact is something that is designed specifically to extend protection to Europe. As I mentioned earlier, the negotiations between the US and two NATO allies on the elements of the system in which two more NATO allies – the UK and Denmark – already participate have served to put missile defense even more squarely and utmost urgently on the NATO agenda than it was before.

I think it's important to reiterate the point I made earlier today that missile defense really goes to the heart of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty whereby allies agreed to come to the aid of each other if attacked. The articles of the Washington Treaty are very important here. The parties agreed that a known attack against one of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. It was reflected in the Prague Summit statement on missile defense which stressed that help must be undertaken in the framework of the indivisibility of Alliance security. Secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has been very persistent and very eloquent on this point. According to him, the indivisibility of security is the guiding principle. He also made the point that when it comes to missile defense there should not be an A-league and a B-league within NATO. The issue he is addressing here is a common belief that the missile defense system proposed by the US to Poland and the Czech Republic would defend much of Europe but would not defend all of Europe. That's why the concept of the indivisibility of alliance security should remain at the very heart of the debate within the Alliance on missile defense.

What is not necessary well known is the fact that NATO has actually been involved in missile defense for some time, since the beginning of 1990s. It is a part of NATO's balance policy to counter weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. The Alliance's strategic concept approved at

the Washington Summit in 1999 states that the Alliance's defense posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively all the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in their means of delivery which posed a potential threat to allies, their populations, security and forces. The creation of a balanced mix of forces, response capabilities and strengthened defenses is then necessary. Hence during the Prague Summit in November of 2002 the NATO leaders decided to examine options for addressing the increasing missile defense to Alliance territory, forces and population centers. At that time they also initiated the NATO Missile Defense Feasibility Study which you will hear more about later. It was conducted under the leadership of my friend and colleague who will follow me here, Marshall Billingslea, a former assistant secretary for defense investment.

At the beginning NATO focused primarily on countering the threat posed by shorter range ballistic missiles in order to make it possible to deploy NATO forces in the region of a conflict. Not long after the Istanbul Summit in 2004 the Alliance launched the NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense better known as ALTBMD Program. The initial contract for that capability was signed I am pleased to say probably by you Marshall, or at least under your oversight at the NATO Summit in Riga last November. This program was designed to integrate building blocks of NATO's theater missile defense architecture into a real deployable capability in combat conditions. It is worth mentioning here that Poland is an active participant in this program. It will also provide a missile defense commanding control backbone into which alliance members will provide sensors and interceptors. It's important to deliver a missile defense capability for our deployed forces in 2010-2015 time frame.

The ALTBMD Program was one initial response to the challenge posed at the Prague Summit. And as I mentioned earlier another element of this was the Missile Defense Feasibility Study. It was designed to tackle broader challenges of defending Alliance populations and territory. The Feasibility Study concluded that "missile defense is technically feasible within the limitations and assumptions of this study". I make that point there is a somewhat confusing debate in the European press and public statements of late that this actually is a capability that has not been tested and found to work. I will let the US clarify it if it wishes. It is a fact, though, that there's been a great deal of testing, successful testing and the

line is out there hence the statement that this is an unproven concept is simply wrong.

Now I am gonna go through some of the key findings of the Feasibility Study beyond that core finding that I just mentioned. I think we all are gonna be hearing a lot about it in the future because it is the analytical groundwork that has been laid at least on the technical side for NATO's discussion of the missile defense issue. Basically what this Study finds is that there are several options for NATO arranging from less ambitious to more ambitious in a fact creating a scaleable architecture in terms of both capabilities and costs. On the lower end of the spectrum NATO could upgrade the old BMD commanding control capability at relatively low cost to be interoperable with national capabilities made available by nations to the Alliance for population and territorial defense. The cost of this would be in the order of a few hundred million euros. One possible intermediate solution moving up the scale for NATO would be to acquire missile defense system based on one mid-course interceptor one site and one or two interceptor radar sites. The costs for this are estimated at 6-8 billion euros. And finally, at the high end of the spectrum NATO could invest in a complete missile defense architecture against the wide range of threats composed of a number of mid-course interceptor one sites supported with a distributed sensor network. This would cost around 20 billion euros. Summing up, one can say that the Alliance can provide substantial defense of its territory and population centers and also has the option of doing so at relatively low costs.

Another critically important new advantage of the scaleable architecture is the fact that it gives the option of a NATO missile defense system that could both be adjusted to mid-evolving threats and take into account national systems made available to the Alliance by its members. And of course here we have this new "critical" element that has really changed the equation of the NATO calculation both in terms of feasibility and costs. And this has been an extremely important development. NATO is already on the path of working through these issues but we have a lot more homework to do to fully understand the import and the impact of the new proposal.

Now, where do we go next at NATO? As I said earlier, there's not a consensus right now on what to do with the missile defense capability but

the debate has started. I give credit to the US, to Poland and the Czech Republic for taking the steps necessary to really get that debate started. Frankly I think the threat was advancing at a pace where the debate was already important and necessary. The third-side proposal has made it unavoidable. And that has been a very helpful thing. What we are doing in the international staff at NATO is to do the work necessary to help fuel a debate and inform about it. To do that we are doing what we in the United States at least in the 60s called “consciousness raising” which is sort of education work, getting people familiar with the concepts, getting them familiar with the work that’s been done at NATO. The fact is that except for missile defense experts at NATO a lot of leadership is actually not well aware of the good work that NATO has done in the past. We need to do this both within NATO’s headquarters and within capitals of particular member states. It’s also important to inform the publics of NATO nations and frankly other European nations and their elected representatives.

I mentioned earlier the need to organize a well informed debate for we have lacked it so far. We’ve seen a number of frankly out-of-place Cold War assumptions and attitudes injected into the debate early on. They were not helpful and I think that they’ve been overcome now. I think that most people have gotten beyond that, including some down right disinformation. I also think that one thing that we are still grappling with is the fact that most people in Europe have not thought about missile defense for a while. The last time they did was in the 1980s. A lot of commentators and a lot of editorialists and others have sort of reached back in the closet to dig up what was the last thing they thought about missile defense. And what comes out tends to be a very 1980s view of things. And so you hear comments about arms races and a negative impact on strategic stability that don’t really match the current strategic concept for this.

It’s hard to imagine how a defensive system in Europe or one involving Europe, the US and NATO can in any way be provocative, destabilizing or likely to lead to an arms race. I don’t think these theories were particularly persuasive back in the 1980s. Right now they are even more harmful. They are misleading and they are confusing to bog parts of our populations So I think it’s important to have a clear debate in this respect. That’s why I would like to thank you again for organizing this conference. I hope there will be discussions like these in a lot of European capitals. They are critical to clear up some of the fog that’s out there.

Going back to the processes taking place at NATO we need to build on the extensive technical and political-military analysis that's been done to date – that includes the Feasibility Study as well as work done by my colleagues on the political and military aspects of missile defense. One of the things that we need to do first is to assess missile threat developments. As I mentioned before this is an area where there's no agreement. The Riga Summit tasked us to go back and do more homework on this. It's not surprising, then, that there were different views of this threat and that nations had different views of the solutions to them. We are moving out on this and I think we will be moving out with extra focus and extra energy as a result of the new proposal. This is work that will have to be done, it should be done this year. It will be an important debate to have within NATO. It will lead to taking a series of decisions on where we want to deploy defenses and what kind of threats we are dealing with.

We also need to organize and prioritize the further study on issues related to missile defense, such as command and control, debris, other political military issues and the question of affordability. But again all of these things have to be looked at now particularly in light of the new proposal on the table. We need as a matter of priority to evaluate the impact of a possible US-Polish-Czech “Third Side” that would extend protection to Europe and how that would affect the NATO calculations to date. I don't know what the final answer would be but I think that common sense would seem to dictate that if NATO institutes to get into the territorial missile defense business it would be able to do so now for a lot less money than would have been the case if NATO would have the responsibility of defending all of Europe by itself. These talks are already underway, they are underway at the experts group, they are underway at the North Atlantic Council which is the NATO permanent representatives meeting. They discussed it and they'll discuss it again next week, on April 19, on the forum of so-called reinforced NAC or North Atlantic Council. There'll be discussions at the Oslo foreign ministers' meeting later in April and discussions at the defense ministerial meeting in June. NATO is very much seized of this issue and I expect soon to spend a lot of my life dealing with it in the next few months.

The last point I wanna make is – and this is a political and military issue, because I generally do the technical end of this – that missile defense system is not a threat to Russia or anything Russia needs to worry

about. Secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has been very clear on this. I think he said: “It doesn’t take an Einstein to see that the system is not gonna affect Russia’s strategic capabilities, it’s not designed to, it wouldn’t have that effect”. The phrase I would use is “it doesn’t take a rocket scientist” and I know one thing – Russia has a lot of very smart rocket scientists. Hence I think that this issue is actually understood in Russia, at least as a scientific matter. Sometimes political statements have missed that point but I think we have made a lot of progress. One of the things that NATO is doing, one of the things that the US is doing while cooperating with Poland and the Czech Republic is to work with Russia to foster transparency. That’s something that is important I think we all agree that it has to be part of the process here. Luckily within the Alliance there’s a mechanism of consultations within the NATO-Russia Council on theater missile defense that gives us the opportunity to work with Russia, to talk to Russia, to explain what this is all about. I heard statements recently that somehow the NATO missile defense cooperation is a screen behind which NATO or NATO and the US are gonna develop something that is threatening to Russia. That’s totally untrue. It’s important, though, that we use this channel to clearly explain that point to our Russian colleagues.

As far as I know, the US has talked to Russia extensively. Russia will participate in the NATO-Russia Council meeting on the 19th of April where the topics talked about within the Alliance will also be talked about in the spirit of transparency with the Russian side. Such consultations are important and they should take place but they are not something that gives Russia a veto over how things proceed within the Alliance.

I will close now and I typically like to do that with a comment from a great statesman. I couldn’t find a great statesman but I found a pretty good one in the words of my predecessor, Marshall. He wrote in an op-ed piece last September – that I think captures the way to think about NATO and missile defense – that: “NATO’s greatest strength is the power of its unity. Unity of commitment and unity of action. That’s why we favor a unified approach that leaves no nation behind, provides NATO with a missile shield for all our citizens and gives the highest degree of certainty that any missile threat, whether from state adversaries or terrorists, will be defeated”. I think that it summarizes where we are very well.

Again in this context I would like to thank Poland for its contribution to this debate by offering to discuss with the United States the possibility of a missile defense site in Europe. I would like to thank Poland again for all its contributions to the operations of the Alliance in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Thank you very much.

NATO IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

*Marshall S.
Billingslea*

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great honor to be back in Poland among friends and I give my appreciation to Minister Stasiak for hosting this event. It's just a wonderful chance to come back to this fantastic country.

I have been asked to speak to you today on the subject of terrorism and the different roles that NATO and Poland can play in the struggle to protect our citizens from this evil. At the outset, however, I need to be clear that today I am not speaking in any NATO capacity, even though I just left my post as the Assistant Secretary General of NATO; I am speaking as a United States government official this morning.

As some of you may know, my relationship with Poland goes back now for many years. In fact, my first visit to Warsaw took place when I was working in the United State Senate. This was when the decision was made by Poland to join NATO. I still remember that visit here, just before the historic vote in the United States Senate on the acceptance of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into the Alliance. Three of us, working for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, came to Warsaw for a final check. We all wanted everything to be perfect; we wanted an overwhelmingly positive vote in the Senate and so a lot of attention was given to this final visit. What I particularly remember is the moment during that visit when the Polish side noticed that two of the three American Senate staff members seemed to not need any English interpretation. They were following the discussion in Polish just fine.

It was revealed that two of the three members of the U.S. Senate staff delegation were, in fact, Polish-Americans. All the nervousness about our

visit went “right out the window.” Everybody relaxed and started speaking Polish very rapidly. This was a great thing for most everybody. For me, well, as the one non-Polish speaker... let’s just say I became good friends with my interpreter that day.

Of course, the vote in the Senate was overwhelmingly in support of Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary. It was a vote, at that time in 1999, for continued expansion of the Alliance. Remember, that had been a real question. It was very much debated in those days as to whether the open door policy would continue. Senate approval for the three new allies was a vote for freedom, a vote for democracy, and very much a vote against intimidation by any country. It was a very special vote in favor of the unique and the long history of friendship between the United States of America and this proud nation that we’re in today. Little did I realize, at the time, that just a few years later I would find myself in a very different kind of job working very closely with the Polish GROM as secretary Rumsfeld’s special operations advisor. Or that a short time later I would serve as the American Assistant Secretary General of NATO. I give you this personal history of my relationship with Poland so that you understand that the comments I have to make here today are very much influenced by many years of working with Poland on terrorism and proliferation issues -- from different angles, both bilaterally as well as through NATO.

On this topic of which I have been asked to speak – the future of NATO in the fight against terrorism -- I will suggest three areas where Poland and the Alliance can play a crucial role: first, in the domain of public diplomacy and dialogue; second, in the pursuit of capabilities for our militaries, intelligence services and homeland security agencies; third, in the conduct of operations to deny sanctuary to terrorists and to support emerging democracies (as the Minister has already talked about this morning). In each of these instances I ask you to consider that NATO is a very unique instrument. It is a capability which if used correctly can offer a range of options. Because our nations are allies within NATO, our presidents and prime ministers have additional options that they would not have, acting alone or outside of the alliance structure. We need to maximize the use of NATO in this way; we need to see the alliance as one means by which we put more options on the table to deal with some of the very serious challenges that we now face.

In the arena of global, public sentiment there is indeed a war going on today. There is very much a battle of ideas. It should not surprise us that there are no clearly defined battle lines, just as is the case today in modern kinetic warfare. But there is an ideological contest going on, all the same. I very much agree with those, for example with prime minister Jose Maria Aznar, who characterize this battle of ideas as a struggle between basic democratic values, between the basic value of the human life, of the role of the person, of individual liberty – values that Poland holds very close to its heart – versus a range of ideologies that we can see at work in the world today. Ideologies that do not value the human being, that undervalue the human, that undervalue people based on race or gender or religious background. These are ideologies that foster and foment cultural violence and religious hatred.

One cannot draw clear lines on a map that will show you where these different ideologies reside. The struggle is not one between civilizations or between religions or between economic classes. But it is a struggle. There is a war of ideas happening. And NATO has a role to play in this fight. Just as NATO stood as a bulwark against the Soviet totalitarian ideologies of many decades, it can stand as a tangible expression of western values, of our principles as free peoples. We need to do a better job of using NATO in this way, to express solidarity to the rest of the world by the West, to explain ourselves as freedom loving peoples, and also to demonstrate just how serious we are, and how determined we are to defend our principles.

We also need to use different kinds of tools that NATO gives us in the public diplomacy and public relations world. We need to better use the Mediterranean Dialogue. We need to make more of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and to reach out and deal with countries of the Greater Middle East. We need to use the relationship we are building with President Hamid Karzai and the government of Afghanistan, and by the way the relationship we are building through NATO with Pakistan.

I think we also need new relationships. Remember that today NATO is deployed in faraway places that five or ten years ago we would have never thought possible. NATO is present in Afghanistan; a place almost as close to Australia as to Brussels. If we are going to go out and protect our interests and explain ourselves in the broader world, and if we are go-

ing to have global interests, we're going to need global partnerships. We need relationships with the Australians and the New Zealanders and the Japanese. We also need relationships through NATO with countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia. NATO is no longer, I think, an organization strictly limited to one geographic area. The question of conducting out-of-area missions is no longer in doubt.

Finally, we need to continue the job of expanding NATO to other nations; to countries that, like Poland, have thrown off the yoke of dictatorship and totalitarian government. We should expand NATO even when those countries may, this very day, be struggling against staggering odds. Even when the gas has been turned off, and the electricity has gone out, NATO serves as a beacon of light and hope to these countries. We must not turn them away.

My second point is that NATO should be a venue of choice for the development of real and concrete capabilities for our militaries and intelligence services. All of the work by Peter Flory (our current Assistant Secretary General) and the fine people in the Defense Investment Division of NATO needs to be continued and expanded. Now, there is certainly much that the European Union can offer in the future. But there is only one place where North America sits down with the Europeans on an equal footing, and that is in NATO. That is in the context of decades-long development of a common structure to standardize equipment, to develop interoperability, and to pursue collective capabilities. There is nothing else that can rival that.

With respect to the ongoing fight against terrorism, the first place I recommend you look is at the Program of Defense Against Terrorism, in which Poland is heavily involved. You have fantastic scientists who are working at protecting our helicopters from rocket-propelled grenades as one example. I mentioned the Polish GROM – they are very much involved with the US-led part of this program to develop better precision air-drop capabilities for our special operation forces, and so forth. It's a very elaborate program and one of our best, most tangible demonstrations of the value of NATO in the fight against terrorism. I think that ordinary citizens, when they look at these kinds of programs, can understand the value of NATO; they can see how the Alliance helps us do a better job protecting our societies.

I would also like us to look at some of the new and emergent initiatives that NATO has undertaken. At the Riga Summit, with Polish leadership as one of the three or four nations that started this, a special operations initiative was launched. In fact I think Poland, the United States and maybe Norway were the three or so countries that started this process. You are building here a Special Operations Command and establishing test and exercise facilities. That's fantastic. We can do even more. You have world class commandos, but not all of the allies do. I think it's a great idea for Poland – bilaterally but also through NATO – to team up with the United States and others to strengthen his critical capability and to help other countries mature their capabilities and do the same.

So, in terms of capabilities, I've mentioned two important areas: one offensive, one defensive in character. I will also mention a third, which is crucial in the fight against terrorism; that is the matter of intelligence and information sharing. In fact, in the fight against terrorism this is the most important capability that has to be brought to bear. I think all objective observers will say that NATO is doing a very good job of sharing military intelligence. But I've long contended that our homeland security agencies, our interior ministers, our justice ministers - whoever is in charge of protecting the homeland – also should meet at NATO to discuss and to exchange information. We have the North Atlantic Council that meets with defense ministers, with foreign ministers, and with heads of state. Why not have a North Atlantic Council that meets at the level of the homeland security ministers?

Finally, I will simply at this moment raise the issue of missile defense, only to suggest that as we talk about missile defense, we remember that ballistic missiles, when they are in the hands of irresponsible regimes, are nothing more than instruments of blackmail and coercion and terror. That's why it is appropriate for Poland, for the United States, for other nations, to consider ballistic missile defenses as part of the future of defending against terrorism. That is exactly what we are trying to do for our people.

My third and final point: operations. I believe that NATO's future is absolutely assured so long as it continues to offer additional options to our policy makers – additional latitude for action. I believe that the option to be able to conduct expeditionary operations, to defend our values, to

protect our people – even if we have to do these operations at great, great distance – that this is critical for us to preserve the Alliance and to ensure its future. The fact is that today, NATO is an operational alliance in Afghanistan, with a training mission in Iraq, with escort operations in the Mediterranean, and with various exercises such as the recently completed one by the NATO Response Force in Africa, and the humanitarian mission to Pakistan after the earthquake there in 2005. This operational tempo is new for NATO.

But all is not well behind the scenes. Poland, like the United States, should be increasingly worried about whether many of our friends and allies inside NATO will be able to join us in the future on operations; whether many of our allies will be able to offer real military capabilities for expeditionary missions. The collapse in defense budgets in Europe is staggering. Two-thirds of our allies now are not meeting the necessary expenditure levels to preserve and to expand their capabilities. Please remember that expeditionary operations are the most difficult, the most challenging kinds of operations to conduct. These are not cheap. One must spend money to modernize his forces to be able to take on these types of missions, and that is not happening in many cases.

Even more alarming is that if the little bit of money that is available with most of our allies now is being spent on expeditionary missions; leaving very little is going into modernization. Military modernization today is more crucial than ever with network centricity and network enablement changing the way we do business. So I think that it is fantastic that Poland is investing wisely and allocating the amount of resources necessary for that aim in its defense budget. Poland and the United States should join forces in pressuring others to do their part. That is something we should team up on, Minister.

My friends and colleagues, these are a few thoughts that I would like to offer you today in three different areas, ranging from using NATO as a way of explaining to the rest of the world who we are as people, as western democratic nations, through the development of capabilities to the conduct of military operations.

Again, it is so wonderful to be back here among friends in Warsaw. Thank you for the opportunity to speak today.

NATO – EUROPEAN UNION: HOW MUCH COMPETITION, HOW MUCH COOPERATION?

*Jacek
Saryusz-Wolski*

Thank you minister for inviting me by the National Security Bureau. I will speak on behalf of the European Parliament which is my perspective these days since I am in charge of its Foreign Affairs Committee but also – and I am looking here at Mrs. Maria Wągrowska – as former head of the Euro-Atlantic Association in Poland. I am mentioning it to say that NATO's perspective is close to my heart. Polish eurodeputies in the European Parliament are known for their defense of euro-atlantic ties and close ties with America I would even say to a fault. They outdo the British here who are already tired with this role. I would spare you and myself complements, niceties towards NATO but I will not join the criticism of Europe presented by you before either because I share it.

However, I want to dispute the topic which was given to me to talk about: of competition, of cooperation. There is a certain stereotype, certain pattern of thinking which reminds me of a pattern offered to Europe: advancement enlargement, one or the other and it took a very bad course. So the question we should really be asking is this: "how much and what kind of synergy should there be between NATO and the EU"? Besides, could there be real competition between the two organizations if EU's head of our diplomacy, its *de facto* foreign affairs minister and the High Representative for Common Foreign Affairs and Defense is former secretary-general of NATO, Javier Solana?

There is a question of structural synergy. Certain EU circles talk about the dimension of EU's security, and NATO circles talk about NATO's security and both sides slightly ignore each other. I am not even talking about the fact that two different political cultures coexist in Brussels as if NATO and the European Union were placed in totally different cities.

These people do not meet at all. Although there is a dozen or so thousand, several thousand people working for both organizations, there is complete isolation on both sides. I don't want to talk about whose fault that is but it cannot go on any longer. In its subsequent reports devoted to the European Policy of Security and Defense the European Parliament expressed a conviction that a close cooperation between NATO and the European Union is essential for the development of autonomic operational capabilities of the European Union. My committee, the Committee of Foreign Affairs issues three reports devoted to that subject: one prepared by Mrs. La Lumière in 2000 and then by the head of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, general Morillon in 2003 and by Mr. Von Wogau, the head of Subcommittee for Defense at the Committee of Foreign Affairs in 2006.

There are many reasons for a close cooperation which is mentioned in all these three important reports of the European Parliament. Firstly, the majority of EU members are also NATO members, there are only a few exceptions here and sometimes even those countries are ashamed of it. Secondly, capabilities for crisis management in operations developed by EU and NATO must be by definition compatible with each other. Thirdly, because each state has one army, one budget and one security strategy and not two – the EU and NATO one. That would be an obvious case of schizophrenia. Fourthly and finally, success in crisis solving and in enlarging stability zone around Europe depends on the political cooperation between NATO and the European Union. None of these actors will manage on their own.

In the period between the session of the European Council in Cologne in June 1999 and today a compromise has been reached allowing the European Union for an independent role in crisis operations based on cooperation with and support of NATO. The “Berlin Plus” Agreement of December 2002 as well as a document on the rules of consultation, planning and carrying out operations between the European Union and NATO regulate in detail the issues of access of the European Union to the capabilities and resources of NATO in order to conduct Petersberg Missions and in cases when the Alliance as a whole for these or other reasons is not or does not want to be engaged. Thanks to these agreements the EU could undertake its first military mission, operation “Concordia” in Macedonia as well as take over from NATO the responsibility for the situation in Bosnia in December 2004 and start mission called “Altea”. Another platform where

close cooperation of the two organizations will soon be possible within the framework of the Ahtisaari plan – as soon as a resolution is adopted and there is no Russian veto in the Security Council – is Kosovo. And soon in Afghanistan. During the last meeting of the European Union’s Committee for Policy and Security with representatives of the European Parliament we were planning expenses for Kosovo and Afghanistan. If the NATO phase in Afghanistan will be successful the EU will undertake means and planning operations in a civilian phase.

Having in mind tough beginnings of the creation of European Security and Defense Policy, a dispute around the meaning of institutional and military autonomy of the European Union towards NATO as well as the role of European members of the Alliance who are not members of EU and going back to the summits of the Council of Europe in Cologne and Helsinki in 1999 it should be stated that the current grounds and framework for cooperation of the two organizations are very good. Why then a conviction recently expressed by the “Economist” which wrote that both organizations got involved in a Darwinist conflict, game of zero in total in which what is good for NATO is bad for the European Union and *vice versa*? Most often in accordance with the truth it indicates the competition of particular member states which due to their geographical location, history and the perception of security give different level of importance to the Alliance mechanism and different to the EU mechanism. What added to it in the recent years is the problem of a conflict between one of the members of NATO and EU, a problem which although totally unrelated to the role of NATO and EU in the European security effectively blocked the possibility of cooperation between the two organizations. It is difficult to predict today how long the current state of affairs will last although the dispute is rooted in history and current bilateral relations of both countries. In a technical sense it appeared as a result of EU’s enlargement and maybe only the next wave of enlargement will decide on the possibility for its solution.

Symptoms of competition between NATO and the European Union are not only a reflection of political preferences of particular member states and disputes among them. Such an image would be too simple and hence false. The source of the problems that the Alliance and the EU are facing lies in transformations in the way of thinking about Europe’s security. We observe the process of bigger and bigger blurring of borders between inter-

nal and external security. It is a result of a series of processes, transformation of the character of threats, appearance of non-state actors and access to new technologies. These processes are a challenge not only to the method that countries traditionally used to provide security to their populations but also to international organizations which in order to meet expectations of their members must adjust to the new security context. Traditional division of tasks between NATO as a military alliance responsible for collective defense and the European Union as an institution whose aim is security and prosperity of Europeans is losing its significance. Overlapping of roles as well as a certain competition are then in a way becoming unavoidable. For it is impossible to describe upfront what kind of potential is necessary to conduct crisis operations under the aegis of NATO and/or the European Union. The context and the challenge of each operation are different while all of them require involvement of military means, police and civil means, i.e. those lying within the domain of both organizations.

The future of the relations between NATO and the European Union depends then on the ability of members of both organizations to think pragmatically and to operate for the benefit of Europe's security. Firstly, the number of bigger and smaller conflicts in the world is increasing and so the spectre of unemployment does not constitute a threat to NATO or the European Union. One could and rather should expect then that expectations of current institutions and their members will be bigger than their resources and ability to face challenges. Secondly, history, experience and resources of NATO and the European Union allow for specifying without major difficulties relative advantages of both institutions at any given moment knowing the scale and kind of challenges, namely related to every concrete challenge from the field of security. However, ideas for top-down division of roles and tasks between NATO and the European Union, be it in the geographical aspect of who deals with what or by paying special attention to kinds of tasks and responsibilities. Similarly, just like during discussions on the future of the European integration held between supporters of the method of community, intergovernmental attempt of marking a political border between the EU and NATO will in no measure increase security in Europe. Demanding such a clear demarcation line will not cause that. It for sure will contribute to polarization of opinions and the increase of undesired competition and lack of trust between countries. Instead of looking for institutional panacea, wait for the disputes which are the reason of today's difficulties to die out it is better to concentrate

on successive challenges and operations. Good cooperation in Bosnia convinces us that when prestige and credibility of the North Atlantic Alliance and EU are a decisive factor members of both organizations are able to make the grade. The awareness of the consequence of a joint defeat should then mobilize us to look for things that connect and not those that divide. So not asking the question of “how much competition?” but “how much synergy”?

Few words on the subject of what is ahead of us but from the Polish perspective. As you know, work will probably start on the new EU Treaty although not a constitutional one. As for the part which refers to defense policy it will be retained and is actually already functioning to a large degree. New and ambitious proposals appear, so far not achieving a wider support but they are a sure sign of the times – I am thinking here about the proposal of prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński of an army of a hundred thousand soldiers and a similar proposal submitted very recently by German chancellor Angela Merkel. European Union’s Defense Agency is already operating and the EU is satisfied with it in spite of the fact that there is no basis for it in form of a treaty. Political ambitions within the circles and political elites of the European Union as far as the role of the EU in defense and security is concerned are increasing. Such will be the political trend and please mark my words. Assertiveness of the European Union in foreign missions is also becoming an element of its political identity. Through those missions the EU transcends its way of thinking about fundamental values outside its borders. The state of NATO is more disturbing than the state of the European Union, at least in this area. There are questions appearing other than just conventional self-content which is always present in every organization – “We, the European Union” or “We, NATO”.

Structurally and on a deeper level the condition of NATO is disturbing due to the fact that decisions are already taken by the “Coalition of the Willing” based on American unilateralism which inevitably causes cracks in the Alliance. I am not judging here but that is the truth. European Union is increasingly composed of many factors as far as its security policy is concerned and it includes, to a much bigger degree - and I would say in a slightly arrogant way with bigger skill - its civilian component, so called *soft power*. Such a policy, such a dimension of defense policy in the European Union enjoys a big democratic legitimization. Sociological research shows

that this is what EU citizens would like to see in bigger amounts, namely common security and defense policy. This is said as a commentary to what will happen in ten or twenty years. Hence the condition of NATO is of key importance and not only strictly its military condition but also its political philosophy and the coherence of NATO as an alliance as well as the condition and coherence of the European security and defense policy (ESDP) as an actual European pillar of NATO.

So what is ahead of us as far as both joint and separate actions of the European Union and NATO are concerned? Will this be variable geometry with various participation components? How will both organizations share tasks when facing unconventional threats to security? I mean the new threats since we are able to deal with the old ones.

The revival of the Atlantic Alliance which both Europe and America need should be supplemented with the creation of a European security community and synergy between this community and NATO. Such a relation is positive, it is a game of the positive score. It is not game of zero in total and most definitely not a game with negative score. ESDP strengthens NATO and NATO strengthens ESDP. NATO's weakness divides Europe. Iraq has divided Europe. The best thing that NATO can do for Europe is be strong. But strong in synergy with European security policy. Not with European defense because it does not exist yet.

Where does that all leave, and I would like to close with these remarks, the subjectivity of Poland? I am asking because sometimes we are faced with a false dilemma of who do we love more: mom or dad or America? And we refuse to choose, we say "no". Poland should hold a very important place in both organizations but with one note – our/Polish aloofness from the Big American Brother in NATO is bigger than our/Polish aloofness to even big members of the European Union. What's the conclusion? There is a bigger space for increasing political and military subjectivity of Poland in the EU than in NATO, without drawing too far-reaching conclusions. Space for consolidation of political and military subjectivity of Poland in the EU is bigger than the one offered by NATO regardless of the great goodwill of our American friends – such is the structure and such are potentials. And so the space for implementing our interests, Polish interests and for acquiring political and military independence should be viewed in strengthening our position in both organizations but with full awareness

that there are bigger possibilities and bigger space in the European Union. If we agree with the fact that there is currently a positive synergy between the two then we have no dilemma and those that we are faced with are false. Even if there is no dilemma the following questions remain: “what and who is the European Union and NATO?” and “why we are so separated from one another?” Both organizations are like twins of identical genetic code and common values hence they should be close to each other. They should carry out common goals and they should have a common future.

Thank you.

Ladies and Gentleman!

It's a great honor and a privilege to be here and to speak before such a distinguished audience. It's always wonderful to be back in Poland where I spent a lot of time, particularly in the 1990s and during the NATO enlargement debate.

I was asked to speak about NATO's relationships with the great powers, particularly with Russia. As I thought about the subject matter and how I should address it, it seemed to me it would be much better if I tried to put this issue in a larger context. That means looking at how international security has changed and what the implications are for NATO and for the Euro-Atlantic Alliance.

Let me say at the outset that my remarks reflect my personal views and do not reflect the views of the United States government, RAND Corporation or any of its sponsors.

I think if one looks at the question of how the threats and challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic community have changed, the first thing that's striking is that during the Cold War, Europe was at the center of international politics. Most of the main threats and challenges were centered in Europe. In the post-Cold War world, the security environment has dramatically changed. Most of the threats and challenges that the Euro-Atlantic community faces today come from beyond Europe's borders. And that fact presents new challenges for NATO and for the Euro-Atlantic community.

This change is reflected in the way in which NATO's agenda has shifted. In the early post-Cold War period, this agenda revolved around four cen-

tral issues: the unification of Germany; the integration of Eastern Europe into Euro-Atlantic structures, particularly into NATO; the development of partnerships with Russia and Ukraine; and the stabilization of the Balkans. Most of these issues have been resolved or are well on their way to being resolved. Today the threats and challenges that the Euro Atlantic community, in particularly NATO, face come from beyond Europe's borders rather than being centered in Europe. These include threats from weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and ethnic conflicts which we have already discussed.

NATO needs to be able deal with these new threats and challenges. This means that the Alliance needs forces which can project power beyond NATO's borders and which can be sustained over long periods of time. This requires a new mentality and a new psychological approach to international and national security. Making this adjustment is not so hard for the United States because, historically, the United States has always defended its interests beyond its borders, beginning back in the 19th century. But the adjustment is more difficult for Europe and for a country like Poland. Both need to think about security in a much broader sense. Security today does not depend simply on defending national borders, but managing threats and challenges which come from very distant areas beyond national borders.

If one looks at present threats and challenges, one sees that the security environment has changed enormously. During the Cold War, the threats and challenges came mainly from state actors. Today increasingly, although not entirely, they come from non-state actors. They are also transnational -- that is, they come from beyond the national borders of many states. Moreover, in some cases, weak states -- failed states or failing states -- may pose a greater challenge than militarily strong states. You can see this in Afghanistan, which is one of the major challenges that NATO faces today. Here all of these elements are present. The basic problem is not that we are faced with a militarily strong state but we are confronted with a very weak state. The adversary is not a state actor, it's a non-state actor. It has an ability to cross borders and use assets which are transnational. So this is a very different type of threat and challenge than we faced in the past, and it is one that we are increasingly likely to face in the future. Managing such threats requires a different approach to international security on the part of NATO members. It also requires a

different approach to structuring military forces and to the military itself. It is obvious that we need to be able to deal with state actors and from challenges that they pose as well.

As far as Russia is concerned, there has been an evolution in Russian thinking. While Russian thinking still is heavily influenced by 19th century philosophies of *Realpolitik*, one can nonetheless detect important changes in the Russian approach to security. The Russians have recognized that the real challenges today come not from the extension of military power but from using economic power. Russia is trying to use energy as an instrument of foreign policy. This is an important change in the way they've approached security. Whereas in the pre-Cold War era they emphasized military power, today they are emphasizing economic power -- especially energy -- as an instrument of foreign policy. In dealing with Russia, there is also a psychological problem. On one hand, Russia still wants to be, and thinks of itself as, a great power. At the same time, it has had a hard time adjusting to the fact that it is -- at least from a military point of view -- no longer a great power but is at best a regional power.

I was at the annual Security Conference in Munich where Putin spoke at the beginning of February. If you read the opening paragraphs of his speech, they contained very strident rhetoric similar to that of the Cold War. But the speech was quite different in another way. In the Cold War, that speech would have been prepared in the Central Committee, Brezhnev would have gotten up and mumbled through it when he read it, it would have been filled with the same antagonistic rhetoric and so forth. However, it wouldn't have had quite the resonance that Putin's speech had because Putin's speech was deeply personal. He believed what he said very deeply. And you could feel it. This was not a speech that had been prepared by some speechwriters. He was speaking from his gut. He clearly felt that Russia was being treated unfairly, that it was being victimized and that the United States was running around like a rogue elephant. It was getting away with murder and yet everybody was criticizing Russia. I am not saying there was much truth in his remarks. But I am saying that they reflected deeply-held personal views.

The second thing that struck me about Putin was how much he differed from Brezhnev. Brezhnev could never engage in any kind of dialogue. Putin, by contrast, was not afraid to engage in a dialogue with his

audience. Indeed, he welcomed and relished the give-and-take and verbal sparring. He thought that he had the better arguments. I am not saying that he did, but he definitely felt that he did. And he had a lot of facts and figures at his fingertips. He knew his brief very well. And he wanted to engage in a dialogue and use the chance to make his case.

I think in many ways the speech backfired. In terms of substance, some Europeans in the audience probably agreed with some of his criticisms of the United States, but the stridency of the language and the way he presented his argument forced most of the Europeans in the audience to react rather negatively to the speech. Well then, one can ask: why did he do this? I cannot answer this question with certainty but there are two possibilities. Either he miscalculated or, in fact, he really thought that by using this type of language he would intimidate the audience. Most of the East Europeans, Georgians and others actually were quite happy to hear him speak like this because they felt the “real Putin” was speaking. They turned to their Western partners and said, “See, now you understand what we’re really dealing with.” I think Putin did miscalculate. As the foreign minister of the Czech Republic remarked, the speech was probably the best example of why NATO was right in enlarging. And I think he was correct. At the same time, it is obvious that in dealing with Russia we still need to be open for cooperation. However, we have to also be prepared to move forward if Russia is unwilling to cooperate.

Regarding the issue of missile defense -- which Putin raised in this speech -- there was a sense on his part that, yes, the United States had informed Russia about its plans. But Russia wanted more than that. Russia wanted to be consulted -- and “consulted” meant, in his view, not just to be briefed and informed but to be part of the decision-making process. That is, if they were going to be in on the landing, the Russians wanted to be in on the takeoff. This obviously presents a major challenge to NATO because, on one hand, to do that, to bring the Russians in, gives them a certain degree of leverage. Personally, I am not convinced that we are at the stage where I would want to give them full co-authorship in decision-making. But it’s quite clear to me, at least, that that is part of what they want. Their idea of consultations goes beyond simply being briefed and informed. They want to be a part of the decision-making process. This is not something new. If one goes back and thinks about the Cold War, the Russians always wanted to have a kind of condominium where the United

States and the Soviet Union as superpowers would more or less decide things for themselves. Then they would inform the Europeans, who were supposed to understand that the big boys had made a decision and accept it. That's not something that's acceptable to the United States -- and certainly not acceptable to most Europeans. I would argue, though, that we have to take a different approach to consultations.

This is true in terms of missile defense debate today as well. Missile defense deployment is not only about Poland and the Czech Republic but also has implications for other European allies. I think it's not enough simply to brief Poland or the Czech Republic or the European allies on what the United States intend to do and why we intend to do it. We have to recognize that deployment of missile defenses will have an impact on public opinion. Therefore we have to find ways to broaden the debate and make sure that the broader public understands the rationale for missile defense. We need to give our allies a sense that they are allies not just objects of our policy. This is particularly important in the case of Poland because -- and here I agree with Minister Radek Sikorski -- at times the United States has tended to take Poland a little bit for granted. Poland is the most pro-American country in Europe. You have supported us so often. We could always count on your support. However, we have to understand that any government must explain to its population why certain decisions are being made. In short, the Polish government must be able to explain not only why missile defense is in the interest of the United States but why it is in the interest of Poland. There is a tendency in the United States sometimes to assume that this is self-evident and that we don't have to explain this. There is also a tendency in the United States -- or at least there was initially a tendency -- to see missile defense primarily as a military-technical issue. But missile defense has an important political and psychological dimension. If we fail to recognize that, I am afraid we will find ourselves facing serious problems -- problems that could have been avoided had we taken into consideration the broader political implications of missile defense from the outset.

Thank you for your attention.

ARTICLE 5 OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY AS THE FOUNDATION OF NATO

Bogusław Winid

Ladies and gentlemen!

I would like to present a few thoughts regarding Article 5 of the Washington Treaty but if you allow I would like to start off with a few remarks to which I was inspired by Marshall's speech. It so happens that I had the pleasure of working with him when he came to Poland together with a few colleagues from the US Senate. It was a harsh winter of 1998 and I remember that one of our biggest problems back then was the issue of amendments submitted by some of the most influential members of the US Senate. They were claiming that the acceptance of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO may destroy Article 5 and may cause the North Atlantic Alliance to lose its operational capability. If we take a look now from the perspective of those 9 past years then it turns out that such views were groundless - Article 5 has a very good influence on the bonding of the Alliance and its integration of new members.

First I'd like to start with the comparison of Article 5 of the past with the present times, with new challenges and with our vision of how to shape the mechanism of Article 5 in the future.

It is of course a fundamental statement that Article 5 although created in a different reality has actually shaped the structure of NATO and the mechanisms of its functioning. However, it leaves no doubt even these days that it is Article 5 which to a large degree is the decisive force as far as the usefulness of the Alliance to its members is concerned. It is thanks to that Article that NATO passed its exam in the past, thanks to this Article the whole network of mechanisms integrating the Alliance members was created. I am talking here about joint military exercises,

defense and operational planning, integrated command structure, political and military consultations, the program of accepting future members and partners within “Partnership for Peace”. I don’t think any alliance in the past has practically developed such an elaborate network of links. These mechanisms have been functioning efficiently to this very day. The course of the last NATO Summit in Riga is probably a good example of the fact that we cannot speak of some kind of a crisis or fundamental problems. What is at issue here is rather the adaptation of the Alliance to new challenges and to new threats that the Euro Atlantic community is facing at the beginning of the 21st century. It obviously involves adaptation to these new threats of both member states and NATO itself.

If I may I would like to refer here to the statement of Minister Jacek Saryusz-Wolski regarding the relation between NATO and the European Union. I fully agree with the view that there is much room for improvement as far as Poland’s increased presence there is concerned but I would argue it refers to our presence both in NATO and in the European Union. If we look at our presence in these structures within last year I think that our presence was very visible and substantial. The operation in Congo was our first such an essential involvement in such a distant theater of action within the framework of an EU mission. It ended as success for us when it turned out that we are fully able to cooperate within the framework of already existing EU structures.

Another example of our involvement in ESDP is our active participation in the EU Battle Groups concept. Poland has already declared three groups and want to contribute further to the development of this concept that strengthens the EU but also contribute to NATO efforts.

I have already mentioned the necessity of transforming or adapting NATO to new challenges, new problems which unfortunately constitute a threat to the North Atlantic Community. Once again the importance of Article 5 is of basic importance here. We also have to adjust the interpretation of Article 5 to new challenges. This is currently happening in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. If we take a look at the last NATO Summit in Riga it was expressed very well there. On one hand, it was stressed there that collective defense remained the fundamental task of the Alliance while on the other hand there were made many decisions adjusting NATO response capabilities to new security environment.

Poland would like the adaptation of the North Atlantic Alliance not to be too distant from the traditional tasks to which it was created. The Allies agree on this general principles, there are however some difference with regard to details. So called flank countries are obviously more interested in maintaining the presence of NATO, in maintaining these traditional tasks of NATO, be it in the form of planning or in the form of investments which will allow to accept NATO's help or assistance in the future if such a need arises. I am talking here mainly the infrastructure of ports, airports, railways which is very important to these flank countries. It also refers to contingency planning in case of a hypothetical threat.

Poland, if you take a look at the structure of our defense expenditures is developing and modernizing its expeditionary forces. At the same time we would like NATO investments to be noticeable in Poland. One of the best examples here is the location of AGS base in the locality of Powidz in Poland. Powidz is most probably the best location for such a base and we hope that it will be an excellent example of how NATO's structure can be effectively developed by connecting new tasks with traditional tasks and traditional functions of the Alliance. The bigger the amount of investments or cooperation within NATO the more possibilities for us to develop our expeditionary forces and our participation in operations. I am very glad that our defense budget thanks to the support of our president is increasing, especially as far as the modernization expenses are concerned. For the first time almost 23% of our defense budget is to be spent on modernization, on the purchase of new weaponry. This rate could be even higher but the participation in operations in Iraq or Afghanistan consumes a large part of it. I think, though, that we are going in a good direction.

I would like to stress that it seems inevitable for the direction of NATO's discussion on Article 5 to include, apart from territorial integrity, also defense of vital interests of the allies. And by those "vital interests of the allies" I mean, for example, energy interests. This has been expressed in a communiqué from the Riga Summit. Energy security is one of the topics which are the subject of our work and we would like for NATO to include – apart from asymmetrical threats that Minister Władysław Stasiak has mentioned – also the problem of energy. The Alliance has been working on it, of course we are at a very initial stage.

I would also like to signal what is disturbing us in NATO at the moment, with regard to the operation in Afghanistan. We all agree that it is the most important operation of the Alliance which to a large degree shapes its character and its future. Meanwhile, what comes as disturbing are national restrictions that some of the countries have introduced for their units participating in the Afghani operation. We have to signal that it is a very important problem and we wouldn't like to find ourselves in a position where the safety, life or health of our soldiers will be endangered because someone did not help us. This is a very important problem which has to be included in a future debate in NATO.

Within the framework of the Afghani operation we attach an essential role to civilian operation, to making contacts, to helping local communities. This is one of the main if not the main condition for the success of this operation. Poland will not have, at least in the nearest future, its own PRT (Province Reconstruction Team) but very skilled officers have been directed to interact with local civilians as part of our contingent in order for NATO not to be associated by the Afghanis with violence. For example, in case of the production of drugs - with depriving them of this economic mechanism which guarantees their existence. On the contrary, we should be able to offer the Afghanis something which gives them hope for a regular and safe life. This is also one of the new tasks for the Alliance and we would like this task to be carried out together with the European Union. One of such good directions is a planned joint police mission which would allow for the use of police forces of the European Union which have already performed well in many Balkan operations, in the process of bringing back normalcy in Afghanistan.

So we want to build solidarity with our allies but this solidarity should be based on a loyal undertaking of tasks, challenges or adversities which we are facing in Afghanistan.

We see some interdependence between collective defence and Afghanistan. On the one hand we want the Alliance to preserve its ability to defend our territory. On the other our objective is to be even deeper involved in peacekeeping operation and other stabilization efforts of the Alliance. We will be able to do so only if Article 5 is implemented and included in NATO's plans.

I would like to close my speech with a few remarks regarding bilateral cooperation with allies. We do not perceive bilateral cooperation as some

kind of adversity or some kind of alternative to NATO. We hope that bilateral cooperation with partners within the Alliance will influence its development and the increase of its capabilities and potential and hence the assurance of security of all the allies and all the countries of the Euro Atlantic Community.

Thank you very much for your attention.

EUROPE OR USA: IS THERE A NEED TO CHOOSE?

*Eugeniusz
Smolar*

Minister Stasiak, Ladies and Gentlemen!

Mine is a rather risky topic and I understand that I was given it as a man who is totally irresponsible and does not hold any official posts. Hence it will be possible to broaden this debate - even more so - as I will try to contribute to it by including elements which are of a more controversial nature, using stronger language than the one used in official - more diplomatic - presentations.

The answer to the question depends - to a degree - on who is asking and who is answering. It's a bit like in the Jewish joke: "What is the difference between a Jewish and an anti-Semitic joke? Depends on who is telling the joke".

In the bad old days in order to say something critical about the system - called sometimes the system of real socialism or communism - one had to say something good about Marx or Lenin. Today however I am not going to prove my pro-Atlantic and pro-American credentials in order to say a few harsh words on the politics of given international actors.

On the other hand, the answer to that question depends on a time perspective. This is extremely vital. If we Europeans have reservations towards some aspects of American politics then answering such question we should bear in mind that administrations come and go which means that we should not form our opinions of United States politics only on our assessment of, for example, the politics of George W. Bush's administration and the current situation in Iraq.

As far as we are concerned - and I am directing these remarks mainly to our foreign guests – Poland’s security policy depends to a large degree on tradition, history, geopolitics and to a smaller degree on what is currently bothering NATO, the United States and Europe, namely the so called new threats. We are much more traditional in our threat perceptions which results from our geographical location and our history. What’s more, recent statements, like minister Radek Sikorski’s in Brussels, and some other Polish politicians’ bring to mind the trauma even from 1939 and our loneliness of the time. The trauma of our loneliness in the years 1945-1989 when Polish society in its various dimensions and aspects fought with communism – in the struggle I first participated in Poland and later on I assisted from London as a political refugee. We were completely alone, politically. Loneliness was not only and exclusively connected with what happened to us during World War Two or with the fact that as a result of the decisions made in Yalta we found ourselves on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. It was also related to German *Ostpolitik* with its *Moscow First* policy. A similar policy was enacted in Paris however it was worded differently. They would say with bleeding hearts that ‘we cannot be interested in what the Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles or Romanians think because we have some important strategic issues and economic deals to make with the Soviet Union’. Hence when forming the basis and some elements of our foreign policy today the issue of our presence, our identity, of the possible role we wish to play in foreign relations is strongly present. I would venture the opinion that at times this presence is too strong and that this results in from certain nervous reactions to experiences which were quite commonly felt in Poland - and not only among the elites or some political parties.

Such a tradition of resistance, of our presence in politics when during communist times we were devoid of our independence and sovereign statehood, our tradition of fighting for our own freedom also in such a dissident international sense, makes us react very positively to calls from our allies to show solidarity, whether in the Balkans or in Iraq, in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution or in Afghanistan. A big part of Polish public opinion understands how this negatively impacts our relations with the Russian Federation and yet in spite of that we have been persistent in supporting Ukraine’s, Georgia’s or Belarus’ independence and democracy. This is a very important element which helps to explain our presence in international politics and to answer the question: ‘Europe or the US?’

Our historical experiences make us look for understanding to our western European partners, understanding of our anxieties and expectations as well as our will and determination to build an European Common Foreign and Security Policy. Security, which in the Polish understanding is treated in a more traditional sense, as well as understood as the promotion of democracy in the world, especially in our immediate neighborhood. From this point of view for us Europe is a source of anxiety because there are many in Poland who do not see Western Europe's determination in actively counteracting threats understood in such a way whilst witnessing the lack of more appropriate measures taken in international politics.

Two elements should be stressed here. First, the attitude towards the situation in Russia and politics conducted by the Russian Federation. Second, the attitude towards the role the United States has been and will play in the world and in Europe. We in Poland expect our European allies to be more assertive since we witness all too often what we very often perceive as traditional softness towards Moscow and a natural ease in avoiding what lies at the basis of both the European Union and NATO, namely the politics of values. Values which are the source of the positive influence that the European Union has in the world and its attractiveness, most certainly not among authoritarian governments but invariably among the citizens of these countries.

With regard to Russia, the situation has changed during the last two, three years. Differences have decreased considerably in Europe as far as the assessment of the domestic situation in Russia, limitations to its democracy, freedom of the media and of non-governmental organizations. We are all aware of that. There are also no bigger differences in the assessment of the foreign policy conducted by president Putin although many were shocked with the tone of his speech in Munich. There is more and more unanimity in the assessment of energy policy conducted by Moscow and differences lie basically in the answer to the question: 'is Gazprom an instrument of the Russian government?' or rather 'has the Russian government become an instrument of Gazprom?'

While we perceive the energy threat as a traditional threat many governments underestimate it by limiting it to a problem of a pragmatic and narrowly economic nature. Hence the differences between governments in Warsaw and Berlin concerning the issue of the construction of the Northern

Pipeline. For Berlin it is basically an economic issue and the investment in future relations with Russia. For the government in Warsaw it is both an economic and a geopolitical problem. The biggest EU member states basically support the approach of German minister Frank Walter Steinmeier who proposes: 'if we cannot establish close and partner-like relations with Russia based on common values, by entering into a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement then let's establish sector-by-sector relations while maybe out of the increasing co-dependency - whether in the field of energy, transport, communications and others - strategic partnership relations will emerge slowly with time'. However, growing anxieties and recently Poland's veto constitute an essential obstacle to such an approach. Energy security plays a very important role here and Polish public opinion was pleased to notice a mention of the problem of energy security in a communiqué of the recent NATO Riga Summit although the speech at a conference outside of the Summit of a senior and widely respected senator Richard Lugar went much, much further.

It turns out that practically all the countries, both those relying on supplies from the former Soviet Union and those relying on supplies from Arab countries and other destinations have in this international reality justified reasons for concern for their energy security. All countries! The paradox lies in the fact that while the European Union treated as a whole is not dependent on deliveries from risky locations and directions in a degree endangering its security such a dependence occurs in individual countries which so far have conducted national energy policies. This conceptual problem exists both in the European Union and in NATO. It refers to the answer to the question of how to make the problem of energy security a community problem - in case of the European Union - and a common agreed policy in the case of NATO. That problem will still remain unsolved in the near future, for Poland for too long time.

The European Union has a problem with countries that want to strengthen their positions and *de facto* openly oppose its interests. We can talk here about Russia, Iran and other countries. Some in Europe accuse Poland of the desire to conduct a policy of 'containment' of Russia. I have personally heard it during many meetings in various European capitals. In reality we pay attention to the fact that Putin's Russia is set on the policy of containment of the broadly defined West - including the EU - in the whole post-Soviet region. Kremlin usually avoids criti-

cizing Germany. Therefore, it can be construed as significant that when German Foreign Minister, Frank Walter Steinmeier made a proposal in Brussels developing an EU Central Asia strategy he was immediately faced with a strong critical reaction from Russia. Moscow treats this as a zero-sum game – the weakening of cooperation of this region with the European Union means strengthening the position of Moscow. And Kremlin have been finding ways of weakening the position of the West, often in the energy field.

It lies in the interest of Poland to support everything that can strengthen European Union's role in foreign policy, security and defense, no matter how ineffective or slow it might seem to us today. I would like to note a very strong and positive statement made few minutes ago by Jacek Saryusz-Wolski in this field, but I think that it is a 'promotional' version of the European Union and that this version, this political outline should be filled with the muscles of a political will which it so often lacks. On the other hand one should stress a strong *soft power* of the European Union which is not appreciated enough in Poland. Focused on traditional threats resulting from our historical experience in Poland we do not appreciate the strength of the European Union resulting from the very fact of its existence and its impact as an attractive economic and social model which is already 50 years old and has truly incredible achievements. Not only is the European Union a remarkable magnet but it also limits the operations of other countries not necessarily friendly in many aspects towards it. It is in the interest of Poland to avoid the situation of being isolated in the European Union which means constantly supporting the multilateral initiatives which would strengthen the internal cohesion of the EU. Possible splits makes a re-nationalization of economic and foreign policies of certain countries easier, which will negatively influence the position of the EU, and in consequence of Poland.

It is interesting that NATO does not appear in the question that was posed to me. NATO undoubtedly has a problem with adjusting to the post-Cold War situation. NATO has a problem of a weakened involvement of some of its European members, that has already been mentioned today. It results mostly from the feeling of security after the end of the Cold War, the feeling of security of both governments and societies as well as from what we described after 1989 as a 'peace dividend', that is from reductions in defense budgets and transfer of those means to social

purposes. It is also connected with a critical assessment of US' politics in Europe over the last few years. The United States face a seriously decreased level of trust in Europe, regardless of what some politicians say in public. One proof of that are *The Transatlantic Trends* conducted annually by *The German Marshall Fund of the United States*. I hope you are familiar with it. The trends show what is happening and I am taking Poland as an example here. In 2005 George W. Bush personally and the politics of the American government were more popular here than in the United States. A year later, in 2006 they plummeted. Detailed responses indicate that it is a direct result of the judgment of the course of the war in Iraq and its consequences. The same happened in many other European countries.

We are currently dealing with a situation when Washington first and foremost pays attention to new types of threats. These new sources of threats are not believed to be so dangerous in Europe. Are we dealing here with a 'global war on terror' or simply with 'fighting the terrorists'? The answer to that question immediately determines an attitude towards the government of George W. Bush and the United States in a longer time frame. If this is a 'war with terrorists' then integrated intelligence and police operations supported by spot attacks of special forces or missiles will do to eliminate the threat. If, however, this is a 'global war on terror', if it is a big, almost global war between the good of democracy and the evil of new totalitarianism, or as some in the United States call it 'islamofascism', then we have to realize that this kind of approach meets with little understanding in Europe. Even among countries like Great Britain or Poland which *de facto* have been supporting the operations of the US in some parts of the world. What's more and particularly important, there is no support in Europe for unilateral American operations. After the Iraqi experience there is little trust and sympathy for actions taken outside international structures, by means of by-passing allies. There is no understanding for the creation of special rules and special tribunals for terrorist suspects outside of the judicial US system, there is most certainly no acceptance for the use of torture. There is also no acceptance for this type of civilization development and that's why the statement which was already said here in this very room that 'we are acting like cowboys in white hats fighting for the forces of good against opponents who represent the forces of evil' is not credible to very many European partners and societies. This bears consequences to Poland and to the Polish electorate.

The United States have divided Europe with their unilateral policy on many occasions. Poland even now divides Europe with its allied loyalty towards the United States. Hence the question is: 'at what prices?' and 'is the price acceptable?' The problem of the Missile Defense and of the missile shield should be viewed in this context. This problem has within the past few weeks started to dangerously divide Europe and to increase anti-American sentiments. It is perceived - when we hear different public statements made by politicians and we read the press - as another unilaterally American project, irrationally supported by Poland.

When I am faced with the question: 'Europe or USA - is there a need to choose?' I answer: 'others have already chosen for us'. Having decided to place elements of the antimissile shield in Europe, the United States made a choice and we can now only decide where we stand on this. It was a similar case with Iraq: 'do we see good reasons to be a strong ally of the United States or whether for some other reasons we should stay clear of the choice'. To many we have little alternative as the European Union does not constitute such a strong counterbalance in the area of security as the one potentially offered to us by the United States.

Again, I will agree with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski that this is a false choice and that the answer should be: 'both Europe and the US'. But in view of public opinion and the behavior of some of the European governments, especially the big and influential ones, such an answer may turn out to be unsatisfactory. Hence, when faced with the weakness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, in view of what we in Poland perceive as traditional threats we want to strengthen allied bonds with the United States and we will accept the elements of the antimissile shield on our territory albeit after harsh and detailed negotiations. The results must strengthen Poland's security. MD must not weaken our position in view of hostile reactions of the Russian Federations.

This will surely have serious consequences for our relations within the European Union. Poland similarly to the United States is accused of breaking European unity. Yesterday's initial debate on the antimissile shield in the European Parliament may be a good example of that. Elmar Brok, a German Christian Democrat and the longtime chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee remarked: 'Those who demand solidarity in the field of energy must demonstrate solidarity in other fields. Europe must speak with one

voice'. In the post-Iraq period not only the European left shares the views reflected in Daniel Cohn-Bendit strong statement in the same debate: 'We are protesting against Americans defining one-sidedly what is good for Europe'.

It is true that by deciding to develop a missile defense system on European territory Americans are determining what is important for the whole Europe. They are determining the character of the debate on the European security for years to come. What's more, they are determining both the relations with the United States and the relations with the Russian Federation. Both North Korea and Iran or other countries of the Middle East are completely insignificant in this debate. What is significant are the consequences for our relations with the United States and with the Russian Federation. Taking into account all the fluctuations of Polish public opinion at the end of the day it is in favor of the presence of the United States in Europe and it believes that the construction of the antimissile system in Poland and the Czech Republic will strengthen the role of the United States in Europe for years to come.

Thinking about the future we should also take into consideration that the United States of America are changing as a country. Not only because the sources of serious threats are outside of Europe. They are changing demographically. And by this I mean not only that a new generation will soon come to power but that this will be a new generation which will have a much weaker links with Europe and with European tradition. What consequences can this have for the foreign and security politics of the United States? It is very hard to determine at this stage.

However, by treating Missile Defense as an insurance policy and by rooting the United States in Europe we are hoping to contribute to such a definition of the security architecture in Europe in the future which will include a place for a strong Europe, for a strong American presence in Europe and for effective influence of the USA and Europe in the world.

Hence by trying to avoid this dilemma what remains of key importance in this situation is the problem of the future, strength and cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO's Secretary-General spoke rather sarcastically in Riga of NATO's relations with the European Union when he said: 'We have achieved a great success since we currently have a three-person representation of the EU in NATO'.

Most of EU member states are also members of NATO. They debate the problems of security on a NATO forum. Existing tensions within NATO, opposition to gradually making the role of NATO after 1989 marginal as well as the consequence of divisions resulting from the war in Iraq – all this results in marginalization of the debate on the future of NATO and the American concept of ‘global NATO’. Maybe this is for the better. Maybe an off the record atmosphere characteristic to security and military structures will help weaken tensions, facilitate discussion and bring us closer to working up a mode of cooperation between NATO, the United States and the European Union which will allow to jointly stand up to external threats.

The role and importance of NATO in the future will to a large degree depend on the United States, on its politics of strength combined with the politics of cooperation with the allies. However, we can only count here on the future American administration. Regardless of some changes and efforts this administration has been tainted.

Poland will remain an active ally and partner of the European Union, NATO and the United States. However it is important to note that at the same time the role of the European Union in Poland will be growing and I am directing these words to our American friends. Poles do not need any more visas or work permits in Great Britain, Ireland and in other countries and soon, within two, three years they will be able to work in all EU countries. In 2007 so called direct transfers will amount to 4 billion euros (7 billions USD) which will go directly from Polish workers in the West to their families here. Four billion euros! On top of that within the next seven years over 70 billion euros the EU will allocate to Poland which will be spent on the country’s modernization and on increasing the nation’s affluence. This will have major political consequences. This will also have an influence on the public opinion here that subsequent governments will not be able to ignore. And this has to be taken into account. NATO then seems to be a formula which will allow us to avoid the necessity of choosing between Europe and the United States. We all need a strong US and a strong European Union which will closely cooperate with each other.

Thank you.

TURKISH VIEW ON THE FUTURE OF NATO

Ersel Aydinli

Ladies and Gentlemen!

A little correction at the beginning – you have me listed as working for ‘University of Ankara’, in fact it is a University called “Bilkent,” and it’s an institution that I like working for. It’s the oldest private institution in Turkey and it symbolizes, I think, the early transformations that the country went through in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Now we have almost like, 25 private universities, so it was a pioneering one.

“Turkish views on NATO” - these will be particularly my views not necessarily reflecting any official view in Turkey. They might, however, be in line with some part of the Turkish official understanding of NATO and the expectations. It might very well also differ from it. I am an academic but I used to work in counterterrorism intelligence. One day I wanted to change my life and since I could, I pursued an academic career. So I represent a kind of a combination of a former practitioner later turned out to be an academic who is presenting now his views on Turkey and the future of NATO.

It should be said at the start that in Turkey there is a certain noticeable skepticism towards foreign or European institutions, but somehow NATO really doesn’t get its share of that skepticism. NATO has been acknowledged and appreciated largely, not only among the statesmen but also within the society. That’s a true exception. So I think it’s a truly appreciated institution. In the case of NATO the Turkish public opinion matters. They think twice, three times, five times before they make a kind of a judgment. That has to be taken into consideration when we look at the Turkish perspective of NATO.

In order to make a good assessment of what Turkey expects from NATO or what type of NATO the Turkish people or the Turkish politicians or the statesmen would like to see I feel obliged to kind of take a picture of the new security needs. That's only part of the problem because several of them have already been mentioned in the previous speeches. However, they are very important therefore I wanted to quickly go through them so that maybe we can have some type of understanding for what aim should NATO transform. I think that this aim has not been clearly understood in the Transatlantic community and particularly not in consensus kind of centric way. That appears to be one of the major problems that we are facing.

Three things quickly come to my mind. I want to do this part extremely quickly in order to identify the new nature of the global security. But before that I just want to remind you of something that might be an analogy with the global security problems. As for the "normal" security issues, such as problems in the street or in the criminal world we have kind of two perspectives of looking at them: there is emergency response and there is the clinical treatment, right? When something happens, for example out in the street you have to respond immediately. You have to go, catch the people, bring them to justice and then put them into jail and etcetera. But you have to also simultaneously think about the root causes of those issues. Think twice, three times, again five times how you can address those challenges in the long term perspective. It is pretty much the same when it comes to the global scene. Again we have issues that are popping up that require emergency responses. Almost like in case of surgical operations, you need to really go catch, for example, bin Laden or the perpetrators of 9/11 not only to satisfy your own constituents but also to give an impression to the other followers of that particular idea. To show that this is not acceptable.

At the same time you need to think about all kinds of long term strategies and the clinical treatment if this is particularly something that can be reflected as the war of ideas. So with these short-term and long-term responses I feel that NATO's transformation is extremely related to this type of understanding. NATO equally has to look at these short-term and long-term kind of needs with respect to security. I am going to probably come back to this point before finishing my speech. We - members and non-members, whoever appreciates NATO – have to sit down and think

again five times, ten times, in order to strike a perfect balance between the short-term and the long-term needs so that the long-term unique potential for this institution wouldn't be jeopardized with short-term adventurous acts. A very perfect balance has to be created between those two and maintained.

There are three concepts that should be discussed with respect to this new global security environment. One of them has been already mentioned - the concept of the indivisibility of security. The indivisibility of security can be identified as a situation when no one is safe anymore in global politics unless everybody else is experiencing some type of relative security. Why? If someone's insecure somewhere in the globe it will very soon catch up with your security. If there is a "failed state" somewhere which does not have a full security or a relative degree of security it quickly generates insecurity that travels through certain transnational security channels and really catches up with you and with your own security. So we live in a world where someone else's security or insecurity becomes our security or lack of it. That philosophical thinking has to be somehow established in our minds and in our thinking before we move with any kind of transformation.

The other thing that was mentioned again – our previous understanding of global security was extremely state centric. In fact, that's why NATO even made its fate, right? It was a state centric world, state centric security challenge and the response. NATO was also a state centric response against that state centric challenge. In today's world it's completely multicentric. Why? As was mentioned before again, we are currently dealing with various kinds of non-state actors and non-state processes connected with them. One quick example for that. As you know, when anarchists first came up it was a transnational movement, just like today's *ihadists*. After suffering many losses the states came up with the great solution and they acted jointly – it was very similar to the processes that we have been going through with respect to the *ihadists*. Those states rediscovered the ancient method of sending the leaders of anarchists movements in exile to Siberia. As you know, it worked. Leaderless movements could not survive. And it worked. Unfortunately, today that method does not work any more. When such a transnational challenge emerges if you send the leader in exile or if you get rid of him, he goes to the remotest part of the world and he reorganizes his power because globalization and global technologies are at his disposal. Osama bin Laden, for example, was sent in exile in Sudan and

settled in Afghanistan and he did even better there in terms of reorganizing his group. So here is the point - in the past non-state security challenges could not survive without the state support. That era now is over. Non-state security state challenges can survive in our countries, within an international system without the state support now. That is the manifestation of their activeness and that's how we should start to understand the new global politics.

Another thing, transnational security channels are now wide open. In the past they were used for petty crimes, by human smugglers or for drug trafficking etcetera. Now the same channels are being used for the terrorists, *jihadists* etcetera. For example, *jihadists* are using the same facilities for fake traveling documents that the rogue traffickers used to use. The channels are wide open for all kind of activity. We were able to ignore them in the past saying: "there are traffickers in reality in the world, what can we do? We can do a little bit but not necessary eradicate it". Now we are realizing that the same channels are being used for example for nuclear items smuggling. None of those new challenges can be ignored any longer. I think that should be also part of the new thinking that NATO should be a part of.

Finally, I think there is another dimension of this global security that we have to really take into consideration where NATO has a particular role to play. This is security and development, particularly in the developing world. Someone who has traveled extensively in some regions of, for example, the Middle East or Africa had to come to a realization that development and security have become extremely intertwined. It means that if there is no certain degree of development somewhere there is no security there either and *vice versa*. Developmental dimension of the security also has to be taken into consideration.

Why is it so important? It is extremely important because if we can't provide some larger security framework we won't get the development that we expect from those countries so that they wouldn't produce terrorism or other transnational security challenges. We have to take both into consideration. Maybe to sum up that point, if we don't provide some type of security for transformation people won't take risks and they won't transform but will adapt their previous ancient methods. If we don't provide, for example, security in Afghanistan, the Afghanis won't quit producing

opium. NATO performed many of these functions in the past. The fact that we have such a European Union miracle is largely because of the security umbrella that has been provided to Europe by NATO. Now that function has to be expanded towards the Eurasia so that we could have much more developmental potential there and so that it wouldn't come back to us as security challenges.

If those are the kind of three parameters of the new global security environment then what should NATO do? I think NATO should see itself in the long-term perspective as a global institution having the ability of transnational thinking and providing security for a global developmental transformation. NATO should cooperate closely with the UN-type of developmental organizations. All so that this sour image of NATO would have developmental possibilities and so that it would be better perceived.

Is NATO doing well? I think there are a lot of hopeful signs. I will give a few micro examples. I've been lecturing and running workshops in PFP center in Ankara as well as the Center of Excellence Against Counterterrorism. It will take us a long time to gather people in those centers, the personnel from both member and non-member countries, the soldiers and officers. However, you can quickly see that through these exchanges, through these debates, we run a real debate of ours, that there is a new culture of communication emerging. There is also an element of sharing appearing. For example, I run workshops on intelligence gathering. International intelligence regime is handicapped by our protectionist culture. In all the countries intelligence officers are thinking that if they protect their information they are undefeated. That's the biggest obstacle against international intelligence cooperation. Through these meetings we see that they understand why they have to move from this protectionist culture to a culture of sharing intelligence because they see that there is no other way around it. So I think those activities, either undertaken in PFP centers or in the Centers of Excellence are signs of such a deep transformation and prove that if we push hard enough and wait long enough we are going to see some positive developments.

I would like to mention a couple of more things. There are several things that we say NATO or NATO members should do. One thing is extremely crucial, it's been mentioned and I need to mention it again – NATO and NATO members must acknowledge the importance of

soft power. NATO should stop looking like a sword, NATO should start trying to also use extra dimension of the power because now it is going beyond its territory to other areas. I will give a quick example. I was in Afghanistan where I was doing a field research for my book project and I met some NATO soldiers in the Kandahar region which is the most problematic area. Did you know that many of them are secretly putting Turkish flags on their uniforms? You know why? Because there is this conviction that because Afghans are Muslims then they have a different image of Turkish soldiers. These soldiers think that it's a huge advantage. And it pays back. You will ask them why, for example, while patrolling an area they try to pretend they are Turkish soldiers. I am not telling you this to promote the Turkish importance but to indicate a broader context which tells us that we always have to relate ourselves to wherever we go. We have to bring up other dimension of the power because the naked power itself is not that relevant any more. It simply doesn't work. Why? Because most of the security challenges now are societal centric. It means that NATO as a security provider has – which is kind of ironic - to convince those societies that they need the help of the Alliance in order to achieve security. That convincing requires us to act in a manner which will be socially relevant to that a given environment and its people. I know that NATO does a lot of public diplomacy to send that message but this also requires a significant campaign based on *soft power* which would cover image of “NATO-sword”. If the need to use that sword image arises then the sword wouldn't be fully naked, it would arrive in a lot of other dimensions so that it can be working.

One last word about the Turkish image of themselves within NATO. Many Turks and many Turkish statesmen think that, and I agree with that, the center of the political universe is moving from Europe towards the East. The role and importance of Eurasia is increasing. Not only because it's a great land, a beautiful land but because it's a place for all kinds of competition. Major rivalry between powers, of energy politics, ideological warfare and all kinds of issues. Therefore NATO would have to move towards the East. Such an expansion is also promoted. In such a situation Turks think that their country is going to be in the epicenter of this newly emerging Eurasia. When that happens again they will be convinced that it is connected with their social power, the *soft power*, and if NATO also utilizes that part along with their *hard power* it should be better off.

I want to conclude by saying that the NATO as it is has an extremely important potential. If the Alliance is transformed carefully it might have the potential to rescue the 21st century in terms of security dimension. But that's a very, very big "if". If we push NATO to go and transform through the experiments when it is not ready and we might be pushing it to a level that may be summed up as "make it or break it" then a serious risk may appear. If the Alliance is not transformed, if there is no institutional coherence and integrity then in situations when the Alliance is used in extremely difficult conditions it might find itself in the identity crisis.

Thank you very much.

DOES NATO NEED A NEW STRATEGY?

Witold
Waszczykowski

Minister Stasiak, thank you for inviting me here.

Thank you for organizing this conference.

I must make it clear that I am not a fortune teller and it will be difficult for me to explicitly predict whether NATO indeed needs strategy. On the other hand, taking into consideration that spring is coming and we all feel a little lost who - doesn't need a fresh look at the world, a new strategy? I don't feel up to presenting a clear-cut and coherent strategy for implementation but I think that - as an official - I should point to some determinants, coordinates, some conditions that political decision makers should take into consideration while deciding on such a strategy. One can ponder over the North Atlantic Alliance which does not operate in vacuum, on a few platforms or perspectives, in a certain context. These are a historical perspective, institutional perspective, international perspective, it is a certain state of idea or definition that the Alliance is working in. Finally, we are talking about that fact that the Alliance is composed of members, states and that these states are in various conditions, in various stages of their own transformation or political situation.

The historical perspective is well known, it has been expressed here many times today. We remember that for the first forty years the Alliance functioned in a relatively simple paradigm which was rather generally described with the words of the first secretary: "US in, Germany is down, Russia out". Such a state lasted till the end of the 1980s. Finally the beginning of the 1990s came. While many international institutions were surprised with transformation and sudden changes in this part of Europe it seems that NATO for the several years instead of being called *North Atlantic Treaty Organization* took the name „*No Action Talks Only*”.

Certain operations towards our region were halted, delayed until the second half of the 1990s. In the middle of 1990s NATO regained its vigor and got involved in the Balkan issue, reached an agreement with Russia, NATO-Russia Council was created. Finally, in 1999 NATO was enlarged with first post-communist countries. At the beginning of the 21st century also under the influence of war on terror or terrorism or terrorists the Alliance started to think seriously about whether to undertake operations *out of area* or *out of business*. Here an interesting transformation also took place – the Alliance transformed itself and adapted, at least partially, to new challenges.

This was a historical perspective. As for international institutions, NATO does not operate in a vacuum. NATO is an element of a big security architecture, operates next to the UN, OSCE, the European Union and other institutions. Each of these institutions is experiencing their own problems. The UN has for the past few or many years been unable to decide on whether it should enlarge the Security Council and broaden its geographical range or whether to change the United Nations Charter which was created in 1945 and is totally inadequate by constantly suggesting that these are Germany and Japan that are the biggest enemies of the world and not Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein and many others. OSCE is experiencing its own problems and does not know whether to monitor the democratization process in the East and how to transform itself. The European Union is also experiencing its period of reflection and reforms. The Alliance is also working in a certain perspective of concept, definition. As I have already mentioned, in many cases these concepts or definitions are either not specified or not accepted. We do not have a definition of terrorism, we are disputing over the topic of human rights, whether we generally observe human rights and only those that we commonly or jointly share. We are discussing the use of armed forces, the role of nuclear weapons and many other concepts.

Finally, the third perspective is the internal situation of major or many member states. It seems that the presidential campaign has already started too early for our overseas ally, the biggest ally overseas which limits the possibilities for the operations of its administration. Smaller coalition member overseas also has certain limitations –the minority government which has to show caution. In major European countries either we see waiting for the change of leaders while in some election campaigns have

also started; others are struggling with their own problems where governments are appointed and recalled by accident and we do not know whether they have a full freedom of action. Is it possible in this case to form a vision which would answer the needs? If we look at the Transatlantic Community do we see a political will, do we see instruments, do we see leaders of unquestionable standing who could dictate direction and speed of talks? I leave those questions without answers.

How does NATO look today? First of all, it has survived and this is its biggest success. It turned out that in spite of such dynamic changes the Alliance proved to be a stable institution able of adapting although the adaptation process after 1989 has seemed to be a permanent military and political transformation. One can also mention here five platforms where the Alliance is looking for its new identity. First of all, we are pondering over the political transformation and whether the Alliance has already become or rather can become a major institution making strategic decisions in the transatlantic area or those which are happening around the transatlantic area. Secondly, can NATO offer so called global partnership, can it be attractive and can it attract big democratic countries from outside the transatlantic area to cooperation? We are continuously wondering whether NATO can be an *a la carte* institution or a box with instruments for the Coalition of the Willing? It seemed that after the Iraqi experience we moved away from this issue but the involvement of NATO in Afghanistan shows that NATO is treated by a number of European countries as a box, an Alliance *a la carte* where one can pledge to perform only certain actions and not others. NATO is constantly discussing enlargement, opening its doors and it is in this area that we notice many dilemmas, certain trouble, certain enlargement fatigue and certain after-enlargement fatigue.

Finally, the most essential discussion which has been underway on the reason for the existence of the Alliance, namely whether the Alliance is still an institution of collective defense or whether we are already talking of an institution of collective security? We do not have a specified enemy, we do not have a specified military threat but we are dealing with some other type of threats. It obviously gives the Alliance certain flexibility, certain possibility to use force in regions where the interests of the North Atlantic Community are endangered but at the same time it also means certain dangers in flexible response to such threats, flexible pledge to react to those threats. We were hoping that during last year's Riga Summit the Alliance

would create a kind of “Wise Men Study Group” which will initiate discussion on the subject of new strategic concept. The fear that the launch of this concept will cause the old concept to become outdated and while the North Atlantic Treaty would lose its strength was the reason for NATO, for us not to take this decision to start global discussion. Meanwhile the Alliance is facing a huge instability zone which stretches somewhere from Middle America through North Africa to vast areas of the Middle East and farther to distant areas of Asia. In spite of that the Alliance, like many institutions, is not able to indicate which of these threats are more essential and which are less essential and hence to define response means.

What are the challenges that the Alliance is facing from our perspective? From Poland’s perspective the biggest challenge is to maintain the transatlantic unity. We often joke that currently the threat is coming to Poland from the West. Obviously not from the territory of our neighbor. The main problem is this lack of unanimity in the West. This transatlantic unanimity should be established not only by consultations alone, by exchanges of information but we think that it should lead to the creation of a strong decision-making mechanism in strategic issues. We have to move away from Europe-America competition.

The second challenge is terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In this case we have to direct our attention to re-strengthening of transatlantic cooperation to something which years ago was called in the United States “*homeland defense*”. The Alliance should focus on many efforts which would integrate the exchange of information and cooperation of financial institutions which would make it impossible to transfer money used by terrorism and which would enable cooperation of border services and many, many others; which would, in turn, make the transatlantic area a fortress inaccessible to terrorists. Those terrorists would neither be able to enter it nor conduct operations there. This is a huge challenge for the whole Transatlantic Community.

Another challenge is arranging good relations with the World of Islam. We do not define our mutual relations today as a clash of civilizations. We are and have been for many years an ally of Turkey, Islamic Turkey. We have been helping countries in the Balkans, we are currently helping Afghanistan, we have a number of programs, dialogue and initiatives which we direct towards the Mediterranean countries and countries of the

Persian Gulf. This is an element of the global partnership of the Alliance and maybe we could test this global partnership in Afghanistan. We could use there our expertise, our financial involvement and maybe military involvement jointly with some of the Asian countries. After the experience we have had with Iraq, after not a very successful experience with the concept of democratization of the Middle East we could then avoid accusations that we are trying to “westernize” another Muslim country. We should start to seriously cooperate with Asian countries which have succeeded in their economic and social transformation, in fighting with narcotics business, with countries which belong today to the richest and most transformed countries in the world - like Korea, Malaysia, Singapore or Indonesia. Maybe we should rely more on their experience and not only promote our own.

NATO also has a task, which we cannot keep forgetting, of monitoring and even trying to solve “frozen conflicts” in the transatlantic area and mainly in the Caucasus, Transdnistria, in the Balkans and some other areas.

Finally, constant enlargement process and the promotion of democratic standards are a challenge. We have many achievements in this field, we have programs of cooperation within the framework of “Partnership for Peace”, Mediterranean Dialogue and others. The idea of “opens doors” to NATO is still an attractive idea and the driving force behind transformations which are decisive in democratic changes in many countries which keep knocking at NATO’s door.

NATO also has a big, maybe even bigger role to play in direct relations with Russia. One can say that the more democratic countries and NATO members around Russia the better it is for the democratic transformation in Russia, the better for the Russian security.

These challenges lead us into a few areas, regions where NATO could be involved to a larger degree. I have already mentioned the global partnership. Our relations with partners from outside the transatlantic area should lead towards the creation of certain culture of consultations, broadening of the concept of means for building trust and security. This would help avoid misunderstandings and create a certain common culture of crisis response. NATO should be more involved in cooperation with other international

organizations. We, both NATO and the European Union, are becoming a victim of success. Hence we will be facing more and more appeals for support and help from other institutions and from other regions. This gives us the right to play a vital role in these institutions – and just like during the times of the American Revolution there was a slogan “there is no taxation without participation” now when we make large contributions to world peace we should play and demand a vital role in international institutions. In order for the Alliance to be an effective global institution it should also concentrate on the creation of a strong center or strong instruments for the analysis of international situation. We must avoid situations like the one in Kosovo when the operation was planned for 5 days and implemented in 78 days. We must avoid situations when we are surprised with cultural differences which make it impossible for us to simply reach people e.g. in Afghanistan. Finally, the Alliance should have the possibility of supporting the instruments of peace building and reconstruction of countries where those countries are collapsing. That is the possibility of what in professional jargon is called “Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Means”. Those are non-military means which the Alliance could use only as support means. The Alliance cannot replace international institutions or the efforts of particular countries. We cannot bring about a situation in which countries where we intervene are becoming the customers of our presence, our hostages or protectors. We can help them, we can stimulate changes there but the responsibility for changes lies on their part.

All this information, these challenges, directions for operations are relatively well known in the Alliance. What is needed is certain courage to carry them out. However, today’s NATO is becoming a certain hybrid maneuvering indirectly between these challenges and available means, instruments that we have as well as certain political will. Since 1990s we have acknowledged that the Alliance should act in a flexible manner depending on the circumstances. And so in the 1990s we accepted the CJTF - Combined Joint Task Force concept which envisaged the creation of *ad hoc* commands and a contribution of particular members and partners in accordance to the needs, appropriately to the needs of a mission. This worked in Kosovo but did not work in Iraq. The Alliance behaved relatively indifferently towards Iraq. We see now how partially this concept is being implemented in Afghanistan. NATO still needs means of coercion but to a smaller degree needs means of deterrence or direct defense of its territory. NATO needs more and more means for stabilization and reconstruction.

Isn't such a flexible acting endangering the mechanism included in Article 5? Isn't such a pressure on flexible allied operations and adjustment to needs, to particular missions going to create a situation in the Alliance where we will have a continuous pool of the Coalition of the Willing? NATO obviously needs a new strategy which would help quell conflicts arising far away from us. Just like lord Robertson said in 2002 we must quell conflicts as far away as they are arising in order to prevent the situation when they would knock at our doors and windows. Can we already do away with old missions though? Has the time already come to walk away from collective defense and to transform the Alliance into a collective security organization? I would like to leave you today with this dilemma.

Thank you very much.

RUSSIA, UKRAINE, GEORGIA, ISRAEL – THE BOUNDARIES OF ENLARGEMENT

Stefan Wagstyl

I would like to express my gratitude to minister Stasiak and the staff of the National Security Bureau for inviting me to a very interesting conference today.

NATO is in flux. During the forty years of the Cold War there were just 10 summits. Since then in less than twenty years there've been about eight. This isn't an accident, nor is it the result of cheap airlines. It's a reflection of fundamental change in NATO. The Alliance formed to make and deal with one clear threat – the former Soviet Union – is now responding to multiple political and military challenges. As the challenges have grown so has the membership. The original 12 members added just 3 in the years to 1990. Since 1990 they have been joined by 11 more. 3 others are expected to join the Alliance in the next year or so and there are more in the queue. At the same time, the non-membership relationships have also multiplied. There are something like 23 countries – from Ireland to Uzbekistan and not forgetting Russia – involved in the “Partnership for Peace” program. While MOST of these relationships have focused on the former Soviet Union countries, the Alliance has also established cooperation in the Mediterranean via the Mediterranean Dialogue. Finally, there is the NATO–Russia Council and global partnerships, for example with Australia.

The main driver of expansion has been the United States which as the world's dominant political power and military power has a very broad range of interests and a very broad range of capacity to meet them. Simultaneously it has to confront a very broad range of threats. The US has encouraged NATO expansion sometimes in the face of some opposition by some of the older European members for several reasons. One of them, and let's be fair, is the fight for democracy and freedom that we all sup-

port. Another is to drive home, let's be frank, an advantage over Russia. Another is the increasing need to construct wider and broader coalitions involving new partners, rather than just the old ones for possible new threats with global terrorism being a good example here. Finally, the US tries to use NATO as something of a political cover for its own policies. It is often helpful to co-opt partners rather than carry out policies on one's own, both for presentational as well as for practical reasons. This is *soft power* as well as *hard power*. All this has evoked misgivings among some of the more traditional members in Europe – misgivings which still exist nowadays.

The reconstruction and the enlargement of NATO has blurred its edges. What used to be a quite closely defined and largely unchanging alliance has created a much broader range of options. We now have non-members who nevertheless participate in NATO operations – Sweden and Finland for example, and Ukraine, which sent troops to NATO operations in Afghanistan. I think such blurring will continue, but more on that later.

It also has to be said that the enlargement of NATO which has been quite broad and quite rapid by historic standards has not been matched by the same increase in capacity, including military capacity. I take on board the point that was made this morning by Marshall that in fact some of the new members, including Poland, are very notable military contributors to the strength of the Alliance. However, if you add the whole thing up the enlargement process has been much greater than the increase in capacity. I would also argue that the same applies to political capacity. The enlargement process hasn't necessarily increased the political clout of the organization. There are examples. NATO has been very good at announcing initiatives much less sometimes in carrying them through. One example is the very many "Partnership for Peace" initiatives that are implemented on different levels in different countries.

Another example is the Mediterranean Dialogue which was founded in 1994. There were very few if any ministerial meetings until ten years later when the foreign ministers met to celebrate its 10th anniversary. The defense ministers met only last year – 12 years after it was launched. I am not saying it does nothing. There is, for example, a contribution to the operations in the Mediterranean – the naval operations to do with monitor-

ing shipping for terrorism and other illegal activities. The program doesn't match the declarative value of the original initiative.

One should add that the focus of enlargement has so far been on Eastern Europe. The countries which have joined since 1990 are all former communist states in Eastern Europe. Almost all of them were interested in joining because of the perceived threat from Russia and because of the security they felt that they would have within NATO. The same considerations apply to some of the countries that now want to join NATO, of which Georgia is an obvious example. Ten years ago the new members took advantage of the fact that Russia was relatively weak. Russia objected to NATO's enlargement repeatedly but its objections were overruled. Today Russia is stronger but its objections are still being overruled, most recently of entry into NATO of the Baltic states to which Russia has the strongest objections. This leaves Russia in an awkward relationship because NATO has of course developed cooperative ties with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council but at the same time on the very real issues that Russia or Moscow think affect Russia, Russia regards NATO as at least a very strong competitor, a rival if not an outright opponent. I have just been to Moscow and those who travel there know much better than I that the word "enemy" is still used with regard to the West, NATO and the United States. Not by everyone, not by the majority, but it is still there. I am not trying to suggest that Moscow in any time soon is considering military aggression. I think that the competition now is very much focused on other fields – politics, energy and economics. But such thinking is there and an increasingly strong Russia believes itself to be a competitor.

This is the view from the top down. The other thing I wanted to emphasize is that enlargement is also a bottom-up process. It's very important that the countries which join the Alliance are ready for it and want to join it. NATO cannot and does not take countries which do not fulfill those criteria. A good example today is Ukraine – a country which has made considerable preparations in some ways over a number of years to join NATO but at the same time has political opinion which at the moment is quite strongly against membership. In contrast, Georgia is somewhat behind in terms of making preparations, is in a very difficult starting point and yet Georgian public opinion is very keen. So both the enthusiasm and the preparation need to be taken into account. I would dare to say that NATO obviously with the various programs, particularly the MAP – the

Membership Action Program takes very seriously the preparation of countries for NATO. I would argue that in the future these programs need to be longer and deeper. Perhaps they also need to have more significant non-military dimensions working closely with the authorities of the countries involved.

Having made those general remarks let's look at the immediate and future enlargement program. Where does it all leave us? The first points are clear: the three countries – Albania, Macedonia and Croatia which have been given strong signals that they might be welcome in 2008. One shouldn't assume that this is a done deal. Public opinion in Croatia is quite mixed. It's possible contrary to Slovenia – which now is a member but where the public had strong objections – that the process of enlargement with Croatia might fail. The countries of the former Yugoslavia having not been involved in the Cold War as directly as the countries of northern Europe feel the need to escape from any vestigial sense of belonging in some previous Russian sphere. That sense is much weaker than further north so a public opinion is more divided. Beyond the countries mentioned there are Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia. The doors of the Alliance are open but as we know the barriers are considerable and it will take longer for these countries. Beyond that there is Georgia. Georgia is hoping to enter a Membership Action Program. It is very enthusiastic but it's political problems, especially the separatist issues are enormous and should not be underestimated. The Georgians like to talk about Russia as the great obstacle to their western integration, including with NATO but their domestic problems are considerable. Of course Russia is involved in them to certain extent but they are there and they are for the Georgians primarily to deal with.

Beyond Georgia there is Ukraine. Ukraine blows hot and cold in terms of its orientation. I believe that after the Orange Revolution after president Yushchenko took power there was a much greater opportunity for the Ukrainian authorities to engage with the West. For all sorts of domestic political reasons that opportunity has gone, it was missed and we are now dealing with a Ukrainian body politics where opinions are deeply divided. I still think that in the long run it is very important for NATO and the EU to engage Ukraine. Both organizations do that. I think that in the long run the westernizing arguments within Ukraine will win. I think, though, that the process is going to take much longer than might have appeared two years ago.

Beyond these countries the organizers have asked me to mention Israel. Therefore the issue of non-European members is raised. Israel with so many of its own specific political and security problems is in no condition to join NATO right now. NATO is not necessarily the right agent to help Israel. Such an assistance requires much more specific and concrete actions than the NATO framework provides for. Israeli officials have said as much. Having said that Israel is an excellent partner for NATO in all sorts of situations given its military strengths, its intelligence strengths or its geo-strategic position. Such cooperation is happening although it should be encouraged more.

Is Russia a future member of NATO? If you go to Moscow Russians of course will tell you that they would love to join NATO. However, their condition for joining NATO is to change NATO into a much broader amorphous security organization which would be very difficult to focus. The cynics would say that's exactly what they want. The problem with Russia is that, in my view, is that even if one were to imagine a far different political leadership than exists today it would be very hard to accommodate that former superpower in an Alliance that has built up around one superpower and which even today has difficulties to cooperate with its alliance members. It's a very hard relationship. I don't think it could accommodate such a large ex-superpower even if that superpower were quite differently run than today.

Where do we look for new members or potential new members? I believe quite strongly in the argument that's put that NATO having secured a membership of democratic and stable states and guaranteed, helped secure that stability in its own membership region should look out and develop stronger links with "like-minded countries" in different parts of the world. I have already mentioned Australia. There are relationships which can be valuable with Japan, South Korea, India – why not? A long time into the future but perhaps. I also think that with the blurring of the edges, with some many different kinds of relationships that perhaps membership should not – and is not – the only goal in developing these ties. There are many possibilities. It works best for NATO when it's focused on its role. NATO itself was born to meet a specific threat. Much of what NATO is doing now at its best involves cooperation on specific threats. We've heard this morning about intelligence sharing, intelligence sharing with Asian countries where there are Islamic terrorists active. It is a classic area whe-

re cooperation could and I would argue should be strengthened without necessarily involving the NATO membership of those countries. That's how I see the future enlargement of NATO.

In conclusion let me make three points. NATO enlargement has been a vital element in the development of the new order of Eastern Europe. I think it will help bring stability in the Balkans and could in future do the same in those difficult parts of the former Soviet Union on Russia's southern border. Future progress, though, in these areas will be more difficult than in the 1990s because Russia is now much stronger and fundamentally opposed to the process. Beyond that, I don't think that NATO will be finding non-European new members in the next five years. Finally, I think that as these develop a lot of emphasis needs to be put on capability. The arguments about military capability are well known. I would say that the issue of political capability needs to be much more firmly addressed.

Thank you.

NATO AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Pawel Soloch

Minister Stasiak, Ladies and Gentlemen!

Thank you very much for the invitation.

I would like to say a few words concerning the issue of critical infrastructure protection which is appearing more and more both in the domestic, national and, first and foremost, in the international context. As we all know, we are living in a quite complex world where interdependencies resulting from technological progress but also from various organizational solutions beyond national ones force the protection of what has been called critical infrastructure. Namely the protection of the system of installations, services, buildings understood as a set of elements providing efficient operations not only of the state but also in a broader context of the international community.

In connection with the character of the new threats international organizations pay a lot attention to critical infrastructure and its protection, especially those most important for us the European Union and NATO. NATO's Ministerial Guidance for Civil Emergency Planning have for many years been referring to this issue. Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee coordinating work regarding critical infrastructure protection has decided to look for methods of helping countries in their efforts to protect populations against terrorist attacks aimed at critical infrastructure. Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee as well as its Planning Boards and Committees were tasked to undertake work regarding methods and ways of protecting critical infrastructure. The Civil Protection Committee took the main burden within NATO structures connected with critical infrastructure protection. And it was the Committee's initiative that representatives of all the Planning Boards and Committees meet in

order to exchange information regarding critical infrastructure protection. These meetings give a possibility of exchanging information on the ongoing and planned work in the field of critical infrastructure protection within the Planning Boards and Committees.

In 2001 the Civil Protection Committee established an *ad hoc* group with a task to undertake work connected with the topic of critical infrastructure protection. The first undertaking of the group was a questionnaire, which was later sent to member states in order to acquire information on how the issue of critical infrastructure protection was being approached by members of the Alliance. A concept paper on critical infrastructure protection was prepared by the group, based on the research and analysis, and accepted by the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee in December 2003. The concept paper presents definitions of critical infrastructure and its protection, which were prepared by the *ad hoc* group. These definitions are the basis for work on the forum of NATO in this field. According to the proposed definition critical infrastructure “ is those facilities, services and information systems which are so vital to nations that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economy, public health and safety and the effective functioning of the government”.

To sum up, the following conclusions regarding critical infrastructure and its protection were worked out within NATO. Firstly, that modern world is dependent on infrastructure whose proper functioning affects security in every aspect of life. Secondly, that the issue of infrastructure has become so complex and dependent on other systems that are a part of it, that its protection on an adequate level has become impossible for single countries, regions, firms. Thirdly, the effects of damage or failure of infrastructure are not limited to one country. Infrastructure has become supranational. And finally, as the last point, in order to work out methods of protection of critical infrastructure a broad cooperation on the international arena is necessary. At the same time it should not be forgotten that countries themselves are responsible for working out plans and methods of protecting their own critical infrastructure. This element of a state's role in the system of critical infrastructure protection in a global dimension has been very strongly emphasized. An important element of critical infrastructure protection, also from Poland's perspective, are exercises organized by the Alliance. Like all exercises, they give a possibility to check

certain procedures but also to establish direct contacts and to create a certain culture through the exchange of experiences – in this case in the area of critical infrastructure protection.

If we compare now, what NATO has done in this respect with what is happening within the European Union, then we have to say that if NATO was the forerunner of certain actions then the European Union has lately visibly accelerated work in this field. One should mention here that in fall of 2005 European Union member states received a Green Paper on a European program for critical infrastructure protection prepared by the European Commission. The aim of this document was to receive opinions, comments of member states on the topic of critical infrastructure protection, which were to be reflected in the European Program on Critical Infrastructure Protection. In December of last year the European Commission prepared a draft of a directive, that is a draft of a prescriptive act aimed at identifying and designating European Critical Infrastructure. This draft is the first attempt to comprehensively regulate the problem of critical infrastructure protection on the level of the European Union. An important element is the involvement of the private sector.

As for Poland I would like to inform you that work concerning critical infrastructure protection has been reflected in the draft Bill on Crisis Management. The draft takes into account the definition worked out within NATO which describes what is critical infrastructure along with certain recommendations and other definitions worked out within NATO as well as certain elements which appear in connection with work underway in the European Union. Realizing, especially in light of the last NATO meeting in Riga, that the issue of critical infrastructure has been placed further down the list of priorities we can observe a bigger activity in this field and bigger cooperation in the context of our relations within the European Union.

Nevertheless, NATO and the European Union remain as key organizations for us, as far as the development of standards referring to critical infrastructure protection is concerned. Critical infrastructure protection and critical infrastructure itself is a term, which cannot be connected only and exclusively with a single country and its tasks.

Thank you for your attention.

POLAND IN NATO MISSIONS – WHERE ARE THE BOUNDARIES?

Janusz Kręciński

Minister Stasiak, Ladies and Gentlemen!

I am to face the topic which in its nature concerns politics because Poland is included in it as a country and not only as armed forces. It includes NATO missions and as we all know NATO is a political and military alliance and the order of these adjectives is not accidental. In this situation I would most gladly resort to a trick I learnt from my American colleagues, i.e. the statement that we, experts in military uniforms are not allowed to comment on the politics of our governments which would in a way shorten my speech. I cannot do that, however, and since an officer does not turn back and does not give in I will try to cope with the subject.

The aim of my speech is not - I'd like to stress is not - to tell a story about the Polish participation in missions of the Alliance, in NATO missions. I'd rather like to bring your attention to or define certain problems which cannot be omitted, which cannot be avoided and which directly or indirectly have an effect on the issue included in the title of my speech: on Poland and on Poland's participation in expeditionary operations of NATO. In order to achieve this aim I would like to attract your attention to a few aspects resulting from the subject to finally reach some kind of conclusion which will constitute something of a central thought specifying this slogan: "Poland in missions of the Alliance – boundary" if such a boundary does exist anywhere.

The analysis of the title, the analysis of the topic allows for separating several crucial problematic areas. For the sake of the goals I intended for my speech I took the liberty of choosing two such areas which, in my opinion, are worth our attention. Firstly, or the first such area – where gener-

ally is the boundary of the missions carried out by NATO? As a result of the evolution of concepts the Alliance has taken on certain commitment regarding operations, interventions in a very broad operating spectrum. Hence one could ask: how far should NATO get involved in operations in many regions of the world and how far in the geographical and politician sense should NATO missions be carried out? And secondly, is there and if so where is the border of Poland's participation in such operations? Furthermore, should we get involved in all kinds of operations of the North Atlantic Alliance and should we get involved in these kind of operations unconditionally? I am talking here about overlapping or not of certain national restrictions which have been already mentioned, although in a different context. These two areas that I took the liberty of signaling generate a number of problematic situations which I will try to present and characterize in the most maximally synthetic way.

It would be a cliché to say that modern world presents armed forces with new challenges while armed forces prepare themselves and conduct - apart from classic soldiering – operations connected with restoring, maintaining, sustaining, forcing peace, whatever systematics we wouldn't use. Polish soldiers have quite a decent experience in this kind of operations. Their participation in over 60 missions under the aegis of various organizations could not remain totally without a trace. That is good. As of today, Polish military contingents are participating in various kinds of missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Lebanon. Those missions are carried out under the aegis of the United Nations, the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. Experience tells us that implementation of those kind of operations requires a very good and professional preparation of a soldier, sub-unit, unit, contingent which we are sending. That is obvious because both difficult climatic conditions and difficult geographical conditions, mental strain and the awareness of the fact that while functioning in a totally different culture one inappropriately used word, one gesture incautiously used – all that can cause consequences disproportionate to the cause. All that requires a very good preparation, very high professionalism from each contingent member sent to those kind of operations.

Therefore in the context of our participation in the missions of the Alliance the problem could be formed in the following way: do conclusions from the implementation of the missions carried out so far let us consider

Polish soldiers to be well prepared to those missions? “Well prepared” – please do not limit its understanding to “well trained” because it means preparation in a very broad understanding including what the soldier has on, the way he is equipped, the way he is commanded and what he uses while carrying out all kinds of tasks. If we are afraid of the question posed in that way let’s try to phrase it in a different way, namely: “how many soldiers well trained for this kind of mission can we afford?” because this numerical value will be one of the main determinants which can define Poland in NATO missions or the limits of our involvement in the missions of the Alliance.

Currently, the Polish Armed Forces are actively included in the peace process in several regions. This has been going on for years. Polish soldiers were in IFOR, in SFOR, they were in Albania as part of the multinational forces of NATO. They finally passed the first exam on Poland’s credibility as an ally soon after this country joined the Alliance which was Poland’s participation in and stand on Kosovo operations or the participation of Poles in KFOR. All this confirmed Poland’s readiness to fulfill its duties as an ally, duties resulting out of the Washington Treaty. As of today, fulfilling our commitments we are increasing our involvement in Afghanistan, in ISAF. It is not surprising then that politicians are asking the following question: “is this mission justified?” It refers not only to the sense and essence of Poland’s involvement in missions of the Alliance but also to the enlargement of this involvement.

Please excuse another cliché. The character of missions just like the character of the Alliance is changing. The Alliance has transformed itself in a very short time, looking at it from a historian’s perspective, from an organization which had been preparing to stop the steamroller coming from the East into a structure which has a very diversified spectrum of tasks while operations conducted under the aegis of the Alliance are carried out on three, if I remember well, continents proving the Alliance’s capability to perform those kind of operations and – in a way – also the Alliance’s will although in this case several of you would surely start the polemics. Looking at this transformed Alliance, at the specificity of expeditionary operations of the Alliance there seems to be a problem and let me express it in the following way: should Poland have as part of its armed forces units ready for use in all kinds of missions and in every region of the world because it is difficult to determine the boundaries where these mis-

sions will stop? Or should we rather focus on preparing ourselves - as far as the structures of our armed forces are concerned - to operations closer to Article 5? Or should we search for this balance of forces that minister Winid spoke about although everyone who deals with armed forces knows that in such a situation finding balance between units of expeditionary character and aimed or optimized for operations in accordance with Article 5 is not an easy task which does not mean it is impossible.

It is worth stressing here during this meeting that Poland as one of the very few countries did not introduce fundamental national limitations in its contingent in Afghanistan as far as the use of soldiers of the contingent for various kinds of operations is concerned. We know that such limitations do exist. We know that various countries whose contingents perform tasks in Afghanistan have introduced those types of limitations. We know that they complicate the lives of commanders and simply require the use of additional means in order to somehow compensate for these limitations. Poland has not introduced any special limitations in Afghanistan. On one hand, it is accepted very well by operation commanders – it's easier for them then to command and to perform tasks. On the other hand, let's not be surprised with the question: should reasons resulting out of allied commitments determine the fact of the lack of limitations in the Polish military contingent and hence the increase of the risk of suffering loses? I liked a lot the statement of minister Waszczykowski who spoke of an approach to NATO as an Alliance *a la carte*. The problem can be also described in this way: should the Polish contingent be exactly the biggest dish in this menu? And if so then let's find actual justification for it.

Gentlemen do not speak about money but at some point it is impossible to get away from the word “costs” – the costs of financing operations, the costs of financing participation in allied operations, in various kinds of NATO missions. Let me remind you of the words of Mr. Scheffer from the conference on the politics of security in Munich, words referring to participation in NATO's Response Forces and the financing of participation in these Forces: “Participation in NATO's Response Forces is a bit like the opposite of lottery – if your numbers are the winning numbers then you are losing money because if NATO's Response Forces will be deployed and the turn for your contingent will come in accordance with the rotation then you will incur all the costs of the deployment of your forces there”. It is difficult to be surprised that we are facing the question: does it make sense

for the budget of a country to incur costs for the participation in missions which at a first glance or in a direct way do not directly translate into a country's defenses. I would like to emphasize in a direct way or, as I have said, at a first glance seemingly. The missions in which we participated, in which we are participating and in which we will definitely participate had as different character as different were the tasks which caused those operations. From typically humanitarian, protective, antiterrorist to typical war operations if we can use such wording for the operations in Afghanistan carried out practically in a geographically unlimited area.

This area, this geography, this broad spectrum causes another problematic situation which we can describe with a question: should Poland as a NATO member really adjust and modernize its armed forces in accordance with the needs of the Alliance? I emphasize here the word "needs" not standards of NATO. And so should modernization of these armed forces go in the direction of ensuring the possibility of using a very large spectrum of tasks where a different tool is needed to each task in each terrain, a tool which needs to be prepared, maintained, trained and in readiness for use.

Poland is or has been engaged in the operations where NATO was involved: in the Balkans, in Iraq (I am talking about its training part), in Afghanistan, in air patrolling missions, in Greece, in Pakistan, in naval operations in the Mediterranean. Is it a lot or a little for nine years of membership? Is Poland's involvement in NATO's missions big or small? Are we active in these missions? It is difficult not to agree with the words of minister Stasiak: we are active if we count those missions, if we count the years of our NATO membership, if we take into consideration our economic potential and military possibilities resulting directly out of it. I think, coming to conclusions that it is worth expressing before such an audience a central thought here which I have already mentioned at the beginning. The central thought of the Polish participation in NATO's missions. Namely: we understand the need and the essence of NATO's missions extending beyond Article 5. We understand the need and the essence of Poland's participation in such missions. And regardless of those problematic situations, questions that cannot be left unanswered and that cannot be avoided, regardless of all this we treat participation in missions of the Alliance as an expression and a test of allied solidarity. A test and expression of allied cohesion, capability of all – which I would like to stress

– members of the Alliance, capability to make common effort and joint responsibility for achieving goals set for the Alliance. What kind of NATO does Poland want? Poland wants the Alliance which is loyal, coherent and able to achieve goals which NATO is facing.

Thank you.